Potlatch Educ. Ass\u27n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285 Clerk\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 35606 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-6-2008
Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No.
285 Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 35606
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285 Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 35606" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
2221.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2221
..., LAW CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
. 
STATE OF IDAHO , s..;; ..\,..- 
--.....------ 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
- 
I N  
- .. ONDENT 
.............................................. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 285 
Defendants / Respondents. 
and for the County of Latah 
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
I 
;t 3 JOHN E. RUMEL 
il q ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
I 
4 BRIAN K. JULII 
ATTORNEY FOR RESP 
/  upr re me court-Couftof Appeals- 1 SlT3'HEN W. KENYON, CLERK 
Entared on AT$ by: -
--  .- 
BY 
Deputy 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 35606 
VOLUME I OF I1 VOLUMES 
35606 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS ) SUPREME COURT NO. 35606 
Plaintiff / Appellate 1 1 
VS. 
1 
) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
1 
1 
NO. 285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. 285 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Latah 
HONORABLE JOHN R. STEGNER 
District Judge 
JOHN E. RUMEL BRIAN K. JULIAN 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. BOX 2638 C.W. MOORE PLAZA 
BOISE, ID 83701 250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET SUITE 700 
BOISE, ID 83707 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . . . . .  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (December 20.2007) 4 
Notice of Appearance (January 11.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Affidavit of Service (January 29.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
. . . . . . .  Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (January 30.2008) 15 
Order Setting Planning and Scheduling Conference Rule 16(b) 
(February 6.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Notice-of Service of Discovery Documents(February 19. 2008) 2 4  
Scheduling Order (March 4.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
Notice of Service (March 17.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Stipulation to Continue Hearing Date (March 24. 2008) 31 
Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing Date (March 24.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . .  34 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice of Service (April 7.2008) 36 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice of Service of Discovery Documents (April 21. 2008) 39 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Demand for Trial by Jury 
(May 12.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendants' Demand 
For Trial by Jury (May 12. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (May 12.2008) 48 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(May 12.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51 
Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (May 12.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67 
Affidavit of John E . Rumel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (May 12.2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74 
TART . E OF CONTENTS -1 . 
Affidavit of Brian Potter in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (May 12,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . 
Notice of Hearing (May 12,2008) 
Stipulation to Continue Hearing Date (May 27,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing Date (May 28,2008). 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Non-Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial (June 18,2008). . . . . . . . 
VOLUME I1 
.... 
Affidavit of Joseph Kren in Support of Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment (June 18,2008), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of John E. Rumel in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24,2008). . . . . 
Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24,2008). . . . . 
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Doug Richards and John Rumel, and/or 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Reply (June 27,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing (June 27,2008). 
Notice of Hearing (June 27,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (June 30,2008) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Doug Richards and John Ruinel 
and/or Objection to Plaintiffs' Reply and Motion to shorten Time for 
Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Re: Summary Judgment and Other Motions (JuIy 11,2008). . . . . . . . . 
Judgment (July 11,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Notice of Appeal (August 5,2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 2 -  
Clerk's Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . 
Certificate of Service. . . . . . . . . 
TART .F OF CONTENTS 
INDEX 
Affidavit of Brian Potter in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Judgment (May 12,2008). . .(VOL I). 
Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Judgment (May 12,2008). . .(VOL I). 
Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24,2008) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (VOL 11). 
Affidavit of John E. Rumel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Judgment (May 12,2008). . .(VOL I). 
Affidavit of John E. Rumel in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24,2008) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (VOL 11). 
Affidavit of Joseph Kren in Support of Response to Motion for Summary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Judgment (June 18,2008). . .(VOL 11). 
Affidavit of Service (January 29,2008). . .(VOL I) . . . . .  
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (January 30,2008) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (VOL I). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Certificate of Service. . .(VOL 11) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Clerk's Certificate. . .  (VOL 11) 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (December 20,2007) 
(VOLI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (June 30,2008) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Doug Richards and John Rumel 
and/or Objection to Plaintiffs' Reply and Motion to Shorten Time for 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Hearing. . .(VOL 11) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Judgment (July 11,2008). . .(VOL 11). 
Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing (June 27,2008). . .(VOL 11) . .  
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Doug Richards and John Rumel. and/or 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Reply (June 27.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  276 
Notice of Appeal (August 5.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  296 
Notice of Appearance (January 11.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Notice of Hearing (June 27.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  286 
Notice of Hearing (May 12.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  116 
Notice of Service (April 7.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 
Notice of Service (March 17.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents (April 21. 2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . .  39 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents (February 19. 2008) . . .  (VOL I) . .  24 
Order Re: Summary Judgment and Other Motior~s (July 11. 2008) 
(VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  290 
Order Setting Planning and Scheduling Conference Rule 16(b) 
(February 6.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing Date (March 24.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . .  34 
Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing Date (May 28.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . .  122 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  230 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(May 12.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendants' Demand 
For Trial by Jury (May 12. 2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44 
Plaintiffs' Motioi~ for Summary Judgment (May 12.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . .  48 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Demand for Trial by Jury 
(May 12.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
INDEX . 2 . 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Non-Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial (June 18. 2008) 
(VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124 
Scheduling Order (March 4.2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
Stipulation to Continue Hearing Date (March 24. 2008) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . .  31 
Stipulation to Continue Hearing Date (May 27.2008) . . .  (VOL 1) . . . . . . . . . . . .  139 
mx ---_.- John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION PEe 20 p~ is: 620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James M. Piotrowski, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
713 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, ) Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
1 AND INSONCTNE RELIEF 
v. 1 
) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, 1 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richards, by and though their 
attorneys of record, John E. &Inel, Esq., James M. Piotrowski, Esq., and Marti Durand, Esq., 
allege and aver their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendants 
Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, 
COhfPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE l?.EL.IEF - 1 
000004 . 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Potlatch Education Association ("PEA") is a local education association 
which is an unincorporated associated located in Potlatch, Idaho. Plaintiff Doug Richards is a 
teacher in Potlatch School District No. 285, and also resides in Potlatch, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Potlatch School District No. 285 ("School District") is a corporate and 
political body recognized and existing under the laws of the State of Idaho. Defendant Board of 
Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285 ("School Board") is the governing board of the School 
District: 
FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE COMPLAINT 
3. On or about November 16, 2006, the PEA and the School Board entered into a 
Master Agreement which govern the terms and conditions of employment for School District 
professional employees for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. Specifically, the Master 
Agreement contains a provision, at Article X, Paragraph 10.5, providing for "Professional 
Leave," which states as follows: 
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at M l  
pay if such absence is approved by tbe Principal. If any certillcated personnel 
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting, 
to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a written request 
for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the 
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated 
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is non- 
cumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed 
when necessary. 
4. The Master Agreement, at Article V11, contains a non-binding Grievance 
Procedure for resolvilsg disputes concerning the misinterpretation or misapplication of any 
provision of the Master Agreement. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTNE RELIEF - 2 
5 .  Sometime prior to May 3,2007, Richards requested professional leave to travel to 
and defend his final project for his Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho. 
The School District allowed Richards to take leave, but classified the leave as a personal leave 
day, rather than a professional leave day. 
6. On or about June 7,2007, the PEA and Richards filed a grievance with the School 
District requesting that the School District reclassify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave day as 
professional, rather than personal, leave. The School District denied the PEA and Richards' 
grievance both at the illitial level and at each subsequent step of the grievance process. 
7: On October 11, 2007, the REA mil Richards, through their representatives, 
informed the School District that the PEA and Richards intended to pursue litigation concerning 
the grievance, but would forego doing so if the School Distiict agreed to resolve matters through 
binding arbitration. By letter dated October 12, 2007, the School District declined the PEA and 
Richards' invitation to resolve the matter through binding arbib-ation. 
8. A dispute has arisen between the REA and Richards on the one hand and the 
School District on the other hand concerning the meaning of the Professional Leave provision 
and the PEA and Richards' rights under the provision. The PEA and Richards contend that 
Richards' defehse of his Master's project qualifies for Professional Leave under the Master 
Agreement, while the School District contends that it does not. A judicial determination on this 
issue is necessary &d appropriate so the parties can determine their respective rights and 
obligations under the Master Agreement. In addition, injunctive relief is necessary and 
appropriate to prevent further hann to the PEA and Richards caused by the School Diskict's 
refusal to classify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave as professional leave and to prevent the School 
Distxict froin classifying similar leave taken by School District teachers and professional 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELXEF - 3 .@f,I@,o% 
employees as personal leave in the future. 
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
9. The PEA and Richards incorporate each and every allegation alleged above into 
each and every claim for relief alleged below. 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
[Breach of Contract -- Count I] 
10. As quoted above, the PEA and the School Board entered into a written agreement 
providing that professional leave must be grgrmted to School District employees under specified 
circumstances. The School District and School Board breached the Professional Leave 
provisions of the Master Agreement by classifying the leave taken by Richards on May 3, 2007 
to defend his Master's project as personal, rather than professional, leave. 
WHEREFORE, the PEA seeks relief as set forth more fully below. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
[Breach of Contract -- Count TI] 
11. By operation of law ald the express provision of Richards' individual teaching 
contract, the terms and provisions of the Master Agreement modified and becane part of 
Richards' employment contract with the School District. By breaching the Professional Leave 
provisions of the Master Agreement by refusing to classify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave as 
professional leave, the School District, in turn, breached its employment contract with Richards. 
W'HEREFORF, Richards seeks relief as more fully set forth below. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The PEA and Richards pray for judgment against the School District and School Board as 
COMPLAlNT FOR DECLATUTORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 4 
follows: 
1. For declaratory and equitable orders declaring that the School District and School 
Board breached the Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement by failing to classify 
Richards' May 3, 2007 leave to defend his Master's project as professional leave, rather than 
personal leave; 
2. For injunctive relief requiring the School District to reclassify Richards' May 3, 
2007 leave from personal leave, to professional leave, and prohibiting the School District from 
classifying similar leave taken by School District professional employees as personal, rather than 
professional, leave in the future; 
3. For a11 award of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees allowable under Idaho 
law; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 
DATED h i s  -fray of December, 2007. 
DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION A 
By: 
John E. Rumel 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
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Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
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Attorneys for DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
VS. 1 Fee Category: I ( ?  )(a) 
Case No. CV 2007-1 15 1 
Plaintiff(s1, NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
I 
TO: PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, 
Defendant(s1. 
I YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the 
Fee: $58.00 
undersigned hereby appears as counsel of record for Defendants the above- 
entitled action. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
The Defendants hereby specifically reserve all defenses as t o  lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
improper venue, insufficiency o f  process andlor service o f  process, failure to  
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure t o  join an 
indispensable party and any other defense available t o  said Defendants 
& 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
rz/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of, January 2008, 1 served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by 
delivering the same t o  each of the following attorneys of record, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
John E. Rurnel [ I U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION [ 1 
620 North 2638 [ I Overnight Mail [ / Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1 606 
James M. Piotrowski [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand [ ] Hand-Delivered 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP [ ] Overnight Mail 
71 3 West Franklin Street [.y' Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2864 
Telephone: (208) 331 -9200 
Facsimile: (208) 331 -9201 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D i  , T F 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 PK 12: 00 
CLEM OF D?STRlC;T MsllRT 
L/&iPPH COUNTY 
J ~ E ~ T Y  BY " -... 
POTLATCH EDUCAT~ON ASSOCIATION AND DOUG Case No.CV- 2007-1 151 
RICHARDS 
PLAINTIFF(S) AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
VS 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 and BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 
285 
DEFENDANT(S) 
State of Idaho 
County of Kootena~ 
1, ROD JOHNSON, being duly sworn, deposeand say: 1 have-been duly authorized to make service of 
document(s) listed herein and 1 am over the age of eighteen and not a party to or otherwise interested in this 
matter. 
On 1211912007 I received the following documents: SUMMONS & COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
/.XD NJUb!CTIVE RELIEP for t_he above captionedection. 
On 12/2012007 at 3 5 5  PM, I executed service of the documents as  follows: 
SERVICE ON POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285 at the District Office by leaving documents with an individual over the age of 18 
therein, who identified herself as GWEN B U m R D T  who stated that she was authorized to accept service of 
court documents oil behalf of the school district and the Board of Trustees. 
SERVICE ADDRESS: POTLATCIJ SCI4OOL DISTRICT 285 OFFICES, POTLATCH. ID 83855 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
- .  ' - 0 "  . - 
RETURN PROOF OF SERVICE 5 ' . - My Commission Expires: 1 \ *  7,5--\5 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
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620 North Sixth Street 
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Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
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Marty Durand, Esq. 
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713 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attovneys fov Plaintzffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, ) Case No. 
1 
Plaintiff, SUMMONS 
V. 
1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, 1 
I 
Defendants. 1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285 and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285: 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after servke of this 
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as 
SUMMONS - I ! A !  OWBGBPiimi :. , @ d ~ 0 1 3  
RETURN TO COURT 
demanded by the Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this S m o n s .  If you wish to seek the advice or 
representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10(a)(l) and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or 
denials ofthe separate allegatio~ls of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, inailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing 
address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as 
designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of 
the above-named court. 
DATED this d day of December, 2007. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
DEPUTY CLERK 
SUMMONS - 2 
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019 2IMEa:Jfg 6.g: 02 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza .! CLERK OF ~$ST~!Q GQU~~: 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
~ O ~ g r y  
Post Office Box 7426 @~---.--...,@&J~EPuTA/ 
~ o i s e ,  Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw.com 
awhite@aihlaw.com 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS 
INTHE USTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COME NOW defendants Potlatch School District No. 285, and Board of 
Trustees, Potlatch School District NO. 285, by and through their attorneys of 
record, Anderson Julian & Hull, LLP and file the following answer as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
SECOND DEFENSE 
. 000015 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
Defendants deny each and every allegation not herein expressly and 
specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Answering Paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants are without 
knowledge of the allegations contained within the same and therefore deny the 
same. 
.~ ... . . ~ ~  ~ . . . ~ . .. . . . 
Answering Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' ~omplajnt, 'defendants' admit the 
allegations contained within the same. 
Answering Paragraphs 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants admit 
that a Master Agreement was entered into which speaks for itself. Defendants 
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraphs 
Answering Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny each and 
every allegation contained within the same. 
5. 
Answering Paragraph 6 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants admit that a 
grievance was filed which was denied. The defendants deny each and every 
remaining allegation of said paragraph. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
Answering Paragraphs 7 and 8 of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny 
each and every allegation contained within the same. 
7. 
Answering Paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants repeat and 
reallege each of their answers as if fully incorporated herein. 
8. 
Answering Paragraphs 10 and ?I of plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants deny 
each and every allegation contained therein. 
~ F(~~-;I;H DE&NSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facia case supporting their claims 
as required by law. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The damages prayed for in the complaint and the causes of action against 
said defendants arise out of, and stem from, activities that are immune liability 
and, therefore, plaintiffs' causes of action and the damages alleged are barred. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, through his own actions or omissions, has waived any right to the 
causes of action pled in his Complaint andlor is estopped from pursuing them 
against the defendants. 
SEVENTHDEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, through the doctrines of 
waiver, latches, andfor unclean hands. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
The defendants have complied with each and every term of any contracts 
entered into with plaintiff, and/or plaintiff is in breach of conditions and 
requirements under said contracts, thereby resolving defendants of any liability. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that said 
Complaint is seeking a declaration based upon speculation regarding some 
future event which may or may not occur. 
TEETHDEFENSE 
~.~ 
Insofar as the complaint seeksDeclaratory Relief, it is alleged that there 
I exists oth'er effective and appropriate remedies which would provide the relief 
requested. 
ELEVENTHDEFENSE 
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that a 
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate any uncertainty 
of controversy giving rise to this proceeding. 
TWELVETH DEFENSE 
lnsofar as the Complaint seeks Declaratory Relief, it is alleged that the 
issues claimed are moot. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
lnsofar as the Complaint is seeking Injunctive Relief, it is alleged the 
Complaint does not show or allege the likelihood of future injury or irreparable 
harm. 
FOURTEENTHDEFENSE 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
Insofar as the Complaint is seeking Injunctive Relief, it is alleged that there 
has been a failure to provide any security for costs as required by Rule 65(c) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
Any and all claims for attorney's fees are controlled by the definition set 
forth in I.C. 12-1 17. 
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants reserve the right to assert any additional affirmative defenses, 
or matters, and avoidance that may be disclosed or discovered in the course of 
additional investigation and discovery. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiffs take nothing by way of their 
Complaint, that the same be dismissed, that the request made by plaintiffs be 
denied, and that the defendants be awarded their cost of suit, attorney fees, and 
such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. 
DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY. 
DATED thir&%ay of January, 2008. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
h 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this aday of, January 2008, 1 served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the following 
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
John E. Rumel [ j U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION [ 1 
620 North 2638 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James M. Piotrowski [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand [ ] Hand-Delivered 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP Overnight Mail 
71 3 West Franklin Street Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 331-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
~~ POTLATCH ~ EDUCATION' ' . . . . . . I . .  . .~ . 
ASSOCIAlTON and DOUG RICHARDS, ) Case No. CV-07-01153 
Plaintiffs, 
1 
1 
1 ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
vs. ) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
RULE 16(b) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, ) 
Defendants. 
i 
Pursuant to Rule 16@), I.R.C.P., it is ORDERED that a planning and scheduling 
conference be conducted by telephone conference caU, to be initiated by the Court, at 9:30 
A.M., March 3,2008, at which time all counsel for the respective parties shall be available 
to participate in the conference call. 
At such planning and scheduling conference counsel for each party shall be fully 
prepared to: 
(a) Advise the Court whether it is contemplated that it will be necessary to join 
additional parties; 
(?J) Advise the Court whether or not the filing of amended pleadings is 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDULING COrnRENCE - 1 
contemplated; 
(c) Advise the Court as to the status of discovery and what, if any, additional 
discovery is contemplated by any party; 
(d) Advise the Court whether or not such party contemplates the filing of any 
additiovlal pretrial motions, including but not limited .to, motions for summary judgment; 
(e) Discuss dates for the filing of amended pleadings and/or pretrial motions and 
the completion of discove~; 
(f) Discuss dates for Rule 16 pretrial conference or conferences; 
(g) Discuss the possibilities of settlement; 
, . . ~  . . . . ~ .  .~ . . .  , . . . . . . , , . 
(h) Discuss the fixing of a time or times for hearing of pending pretrial motions; 
(i) Discuss the fixing of a trial date; 
(j) Discuss any other matters appropriate iri the circumstances of the case, including 
th; expeditious disposition of the above entitled action. 
PROVIDED, however, that counsel wilI not be required to attend the conference i f 
they file with the clerk of the Court, at least five (5) days prior to the conference, a 
stipulation covering all of the above matters. Should the stipulation not be satisfactory to 
the court, a new date for the conference will be ordered. 
In the event that counsel for any party is unable to participate in such planning and 
scheduling conference because of prior co&t commitments on the date above schedul'ed, it 
is the duty of such counsel to contact the Cowt and opposing counsel and arrange a 
mutually satisfactory date to which the matter wilI be continued. 
DATED this of February, 2008. 
JO& R. Stegner' 
District Judge 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T do herebv certrfy that a full, 
true and coriect copy of the foregoing 
- 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE - RULE 16(b) was mailed to: 
Brian I<. Julian 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
James M. Piotrowski 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2864 
Boise, ID 83701-2864 
I 
I John E. Rumel 
I Attorney at Law 620 North 2638 
I Boise, ID 83701 
OWER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDrnING CONFERENCE - 3 
@ v ~ o D I P J I  51 c\SE M i j  ... 
Brian K.. Julian - IS5 No. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019 Zg@FEB (9  P&i2:53 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza CLERK GF ~i$?;{%cr;.[ c%!RT 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 LA;{\+{ Cio\jWTy 
Post Office Box 7426 ..... .. . . .- &QEFU:V I... , , 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208)  344-551 0 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
awhite@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS . . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
~~ . THE SECOND--JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
vs. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS 
I 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 1 2  day of February, 2008., 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, 
served a copy of DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS - 7 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, together wi th  a copy o f  this 
Notice;upon counsel for the Plaintiffs, by  first-class mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to;  by fax transmission to; by  overnight delivery to; or by personally 
delivering t o  or leaving wi th  a person in charge of the office as indicated below: 
John Rumel [ ] U.S. Mail,  repaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION [ I Hand-Delivered 
6 2 0  North Sixth Street [ ] Overnight Mail 
PO Box 2638  [X 1 Facsimile 208-344-1 6 0 6  
Boise, ID 83701 
208-333-8560 
~.~ . ~~ . ...... ~ 
. .  . . - .. . - 
James Piotrowski [ ] U.S.  ail, postage prepaid 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI [ 1 Hand-Delivered 
7 1  3 West Franklin Street [ ] Overnight Mail 
PO Box 2 8 6 4  [X ] Facsimile 2081331 -9201 
Boise, ID 83701 -2864 
208-331 -9200 
.,/ 
- I dT ~ G - 5 5  Brian K. Julian 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS - 2 
1 Y DF t'%lQiCT CO!IRT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I & % L ~ @ ~ T ~  
. &PIJTY EY -.--" . .- 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAJ3 
POTLATCH EDUCATION % 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, ) Case No. CV-07-01151 
Plaintiffs, 1 SCHEDULING ORDER 
VS. 1 
\ 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
As the result of a n  informal planning and scheduling. conference conducted by 
telephone confere~nce on March 3, 2008, with counsel for each of the respective parties 
participating, the Court enters the following ORDERS: 
(1) Plaintiffs' opening brief must be filed and served no Iater than March 31,2008; 
(2) The response brief shall be senred and filed no later than April 14,2008; 
(3) The reply brief, if any, shall be served and filed no later than April 28,2008; and 
(4) Oral argument is set to commence at 10:00 ~.1\k. on May 5,2008, in Courtroom 
#3 of the Latah County Courthouse. 
DATED this 3% of March, 2008. 
~ o h n k .  Stegner 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certdy that a full, true, complete and 
correct copies of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER 
was mailed to: 
Brian K. JuIian 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
James M. Piotrowski 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2864 
Boise, ID 83701-2864 
John E. Rumel 
Attorney at Law 
Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
I on this ___ LC day of March, 2008 
I 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 2088I9WR 17 WHJ1:43 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 CLERK OF G!STRICT COURT 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James M. Piotrowski, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
ElERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
713 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attorneys fov P1aintzJ.s 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 1 
1 Case No. CV2007-1151 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 NOTICE OF SERVICE 
V. 1 
) 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
I hereby certify that on the 11'' day of March, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION, AND INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS to be served via facsimile 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1 
transmission on: 
Amy White, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-5510 
of March, 2008. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
I 
By: 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the &ay of March, 2008, I caused a We  and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivered 
to: 
Any  White, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-55 10 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3 
Brian K .  Julian - ISB No. 2360 
Amy G. White - IS8 No. 5019 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W, Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suits 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: biulian@aihIaw.com 
awhite@ajhIaw.com 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COUi(S 
LATA OUNTY 
BY_--..- & BEPUTY 
At to rn eys  for DEFENDANTS. 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
. ~ THE SEc0N6;lWDIClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF U T A H  
Plaintiff (s), 
vs. 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
HEARING DATE 
Case No. CV 2007- 1 151 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, a n d  BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285. 
COME NOW The Plainriffs and Defendants, by and Through their 
counsel o f  record, and based upon t h e  following information, hereby 
stipulate a n d  agree that after the, soheduliny conference of Monday ,  March 
3, 2008, counsel for the parties have further disoussed this case and have 
determined that additional time for discovery is needed in order .lo insure that 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -I 
25 -20 -2008  02:23PM FROM-HERZFELD P L  .OIVSKI 
. . 
.-, 
- W E . , .  *..YV LL. d.J 
" .- . 
LL(DJLiLI1 / .' 1 IEA LESAL SERVI.. . ~ 5 03, /13/ I1B 0$108 FAX' S085446t''. 
-..--. -.-7 ---. 
_, . .- 
W I Z t O O N ,  JUbxm. $ HULL 
L 
ell relevant evidence is disoovered and produced. The parties are therefore 
requesting that the  ourrent hearing date in rhis maner of May 6, 2008, be 
reset by this Wonarabia Court ta a dare in June or July of ZOOS, wirh the 
rel~vent briefing schedules changed TO cortcI8Te the new hearing date and 
time. 
+- DATED this a day of March, 2008. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Idaho Educmlon A~lsoclarlon 1 
~ v ~ - s 2 ~ >  John E. Rumel /' 
WERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -2 
.g3-2p-2008 DZ:23PId FROM-KERZFELD P ,OWSKI 
. . 
,.< . - I' .. ,, , 
CERTIFICATE OF M A W  
w 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s  day of, March 2008, 1 served a 
t rue  and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
HEARING DATE by delivering rhe same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed a s  i o l l ~ws :  
John E. Rurnel [ I U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION [ 1 
6 2 0  North 2638 [ 1 Overnight Mail [ k/ Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208)  333-8560 
Facsimile: (208)  344-1 606 
James  M. Piotrowslci [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand [ 1 Hand-Delivered 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP f ] Overnight Mail 
7 1 3  West Franklin S~rea t  [ /l/ Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83702 -2864 
Telephone: (208) 331 -9200 
Facsimile: (208)  331 -9201 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -3 
II . . .. ..., 
S- 
& OB~SSNAL 
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: biulian@,aihlaw.com 
awhite@aihlaw.com 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
and DOUG RICHARDS, 
Upon Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, adjudge 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
vs , 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285, 
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285 
and decree that the hearing currently set for May 5, 2008 be vacated and reset to 
Piaintiff(s), 
ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING HEARING DATE 
June 9, 2008 at 10:OO a.m. 
t"^  DATED this Zft day of March, 2008. 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE - I , 0861031'8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this a day of March, 2008, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing by delivering 
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
John E. Rumel [< U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Idaho Education Association [ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail P.0, Box 2638 [ 1 Facs~mile 
Boise, ID 83701 
James M. Piotrowski U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand 
Herzfeld & Piotrowski 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, ID 83701 
Brian K. Julian 
Anderson Julian & Hull 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile 
[A U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
nDnER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE - 2 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephol~e: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James N. Piotrowskci, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
713 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attorneys fir Plaiiztzffs 
CLERK .OF DiSTRIGI COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAW 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 1 
1 Case No. CV2007-I 15 1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 NOTICE OF SERVICE 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, 1 
1 
Defendants. 
I hereby certify that on the lSt day of April, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDMTS' FBST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION to be served via hand delivery on: 
Amy White, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, P;LP 
C W Moore Plaza 
250 South Fif th  Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
&+dlay of April, 2008. DATED this - 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
By: 
John E. Rumel 
k 
Attorney for plaintiff potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
CERTFICATROF SERVICE 
I HEREBY C E R T W  That on the &qay of Aprrl, 2 0 0 8 1  caused a tme and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
U.S. Mail 
A- Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivered 
to: 
Amy White, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-551 0 
NOTTCE OF SERVICE - 3 
, . , . . , . . . .. . 
.. . 
. - 
.. 
(r .',) 
CASENO. t1/-07 / I S )  
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 501 9 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250  South Fifth Street, Suite 7 0 0  
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
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Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Richards move for an Order from this 
Court striking Defendants' Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch 
School District No. 285's (collectively, "School District") demand for trial by jury set forth in 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICBARDS, 
Plaintiff, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285. 
Defendants. 
1 
1 Case No. CV2007-1151 
1 PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
1 STRIKE DEFENDANTS' 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In their Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Defendants Potlatch School 
District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285 (collectively "School 
District") have demanded a trial by jury. However, as discussed more fully below, Plaintiffs 
0130044 
PT,AINTFFS' MEMORANDUM a\T SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE, ETC. - 1 
Potlatch Education Association ("'PEA") and Doug Richards have sought equitable relief, not 
damages, and Idaho law makes clear that claims seeking solely equitable relief are triable to the 
Court, not to a jury. For these reasons, the School District's demand for trial by jury should and 
must be stricken. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Based on Well-Settled Idaho Law, the School District's Demand for Trial by Jury 
Must be Stricken. 
Idaho appellate courts have made clear that where a plaintiff, in a declaratory relief action 
or otherwise, seeks only equitable relief and not damages, h e  issues are triable to the court, not 
to a jw. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 361, 796 P.2d 1026, I034 (Ct. App. 1990); 
Temperance Irzs. &change v. Cawer, 83 Idaho 487,493,365 P.2d si4,827 (1961). 
The PEA and Richards have brought two claims for breach of contract against the School 
District: Specifically, the PEA and Richards allege that the School District breached the 
Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement entered into between the PEA and the 
School Board and, in turn, breached Richards' indfvidual employme~~t contract by charging 
Richards with use of a personal leave day, rather than granting a professional leave day, 
concerning his travel to and defense of his final project for his  aster's thesis in Education at the 
University of Idaho. 111 their Prayer for Relief, the PEA and Richards have sought declaratory 
and equitable relief, not damages, on their claims. Accordingly, under well-settled Idaho law 
and because the PEA and Richards have limited the relief requested by them to equitable relief, a 
trial on the PEA and Richards' clailns would be to the Court, not to a jyy.  
D T  A n\rTTRFS' MEMORANDUM W SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE, ETC. - 2 00004Z 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, the PEA and Richards' Motion to Strikc the School 
District's demand for trial by jury should and must be granted. 
f&J' DATED this - 8ay of May, 2008. 
DAHO EDUCATION ASSOClATION 
By: 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
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-- . ~ . ~ ~ n : c c ,  h f E M O m U M  SWPORT OF MOTION TO STRTICE, ETC. - 4 0 0 8 0 7 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Sheet 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 34/1-1606 
James M. Piotrowski, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
7 13 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 331-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CLERK OF GISTRICT CO!,F!T 
IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ) 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 1 
Case No. CV2007- 1 15 1 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY SUGDMENT 
1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, 1 
1 
Defendants. ) 
> 
Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug Ilichards, by and through their 
counsel of record, hereby move this Court for Summary Judgment on each and every claim for 
relief contained in their Complaint on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact such that judgment should be granted in their favor and against Defendant Potlatch School 
PLAMTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 285 
The PEA and Richards' Motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c) and supported by the Affidavits of Doug Richards, Brian Potter and John Rurnel, each with 
exhibits attached, as well as by a supporting Memorandum -- all filed concurrently herewith. 
G1%ay of May, 2008. DATED this - 
D A H O  EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
By: 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
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IN THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG NCHARDS, ) 
1 Case No. CV2007-1151 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
1 
1 PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUN 
1 IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a decision that can only be viewed as shortsighted and against the interest of all 
stakeholders iu. the local community, Defendants Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of 
Trustees, Potlatch School District No. 825 (collectively, "School District") refus'ed to allow 
Plaintiff Doug Richards to use a professional leave day to travel to and defend bis final project 
--- ' - - T m K  @TTDDnRT OF MOTION FOR SUMMhRY SUDGMENT - 1 00005% 
for his Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho. Certainly, the PEA and 
Richards can and do question why the School District would talce a position that impedes, rather 
than encourages, its teachers fiom furthering their post-Bachelor's Degree education by 
obtaining advanced degrees -- particularly where such professional development will inure to the 
benefit of the School District, teachers, and the students that they teach. Moreover, educational 
policy and leadership lapses aside, the PEA and Richards will demonstrate below that the School 
District's decision to deny Richards' use of professional leave under the above-described 
circumstances (which effectively forced him to use a personal leave day) constitutes a breach of 
the Professional Leave provisions of the PEA-School Board Master Agreement and, in turn, 
constitutes a breach of Richards' individual employment contract with the School District. 
For these reasons, this Court should grant the PEA and Richards' motion for summary 
i judgment on its Complaint for two (2) counts of breach of contract and issue declaratory md 
I 
equitable orders requiring the School District to reclassify Richards' leave for defending his &a1 I 
project as professional leave and restore a personal leave day to Richards 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Doug Richards is a long-time teacher in the School District. (Affidavit of Doug Richards 
in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ('Richards Aff."), 7 I). The PEA is a 
local education association which, since approximately June 2003, has been the sole and 
exclusive bargaining representative for certificated professional employees, including teachers, 
in the School District. (Affidavit of Brian Potter in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Potter Aff."), 77 2-5 and 6, Exs. C and D). 
During the 2003-2004 school year, the PEA and the Scllool Board negotiated their first 
I 
Master Agreement. (Id., qq 2-5, Exs. A-C). As part of those negotiations, the PEA proposed that 
the parties enter into an agreement regarding professional leave. (Potter Aff., 3 3, Ex. A). The 
initial Professioaal Leave language proposed by the PEA provided as follows: 
Professional Leave 
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full 
pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any supervisor, principal, 
teacher, or other employee wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to 
attend a professional meeting, to visit schools, or for any personal reason wbich is 
not an unavoidable reason, a written request for approval of such absence should 
be signed by the principal and filed in the superintendent's office at least two (2) 
days prior to the first day of anticipated absence. 
(Id.). 
The School Board and the PEA negotiated off of the PEA'S Professional Leave proposal, 
eventually agreeing to a Professional Leave provision which was included in the 2003-2004 and 
2004-2005 school year Master Agreement and which has remained uncl~anged as Article X: 
paragraph 10.5 in the Master Agreeinent for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. (Id:, 77 
3-6, Exs. A-D). That provision provides as follows: 
ProfessionaI Leave 
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full 
pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any certificated personnel 
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting, 
to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional developmei~t, a written request 
for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the 
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated 
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is non- 
cumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed 
when necessary. 
(Id., 77 5-6, Exs. C and D). 
The PEA-School Board Master Agreement has at all times contained provisions 
concerning salary, as well as a Salary Schedule. (Id., $7 5-6, Exs. C and D). Thus, from the 
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school year Master Agreement to the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 
school year Master Agreement, Article XV, Salary, paragraph 15.1, has provided as follows: 
----' . ,-% Ifin A XmTTKd n\i CT IPPORT OF MOTION rjOR SUi'&!VfARY m G M E N T  - 3 1300053 
1. The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for the 
several professional positions in the school district that will: 
C.  Stimblate professional growth while in service. 
* * *  
7.  Advance~nent on the Salary Schedule by New Eiployees. Only those 
credits earned after the date of certification or award of a Bachelor Degree 
in Education will be acceptable for salary advancement. 
8. The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix A. 
(Potter Aff., 77 5-6, Exs. C and D). 
The Salary Schedule agreed to by the School Board and PEA for the relevant school 
i 
i 
years compensates School District teachers and other certificated professionals on fhe basis of 
I 
their years of experience and (2) their post-Bachelor degrees, including Master's and doctorate, 
1 
and post-Bachelor's credits. (Id.). 
The PEA-School Board Master Agreement for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school 
years also contain a non-binding grievance procedures for resolving disputes concerning the 
misinterpretation or misapplication of any provision of the Master Agreement. (Id., 7 6, EX. D). 
In late-April, 2007, Richards requested professional leave for and, on May 3,  2007, did, 
in fact, travel to Coeur d'Alene to defend his final project for his Master's Degree in Education 
from the U~liversity of Idaho. (Richards Aff., 77 2 and 3). The School District allowed Richards 
to take the leave, but classified the leave as a personal leave day, rather than a professional leave 
day. (Id., 1 3, Exs. B and C). During the 2006-2007 school year, Richards requested a total of 
two (2) professional leave days for absences that he believed qualified for professional leave 
purposes, one of which was to defend his Master's firla1 project. (Id., 7 4). And, although 
Richards was absent from school or his classroom during that same school year on other 
occasions and for other reasons such as illness, bereavement or attendance at music events with 
his students (for rehearsals, Chrishnas programs or music programs outside of Potlatch), illose 
abse~ices were either covered by sick, personal or bereavement leave provisions or involved the 
perfo~mance of Richards' job duties, including supervising students. (Richards Aff., 7  4). 
On or about June 8, 2007, the PEA and Richards filed a grievance with the School 
District, requesting that the School District reclassify Richards' May 3, 2007 leave day as 
professional, rather than personal, leave. (Potter Aff., 'l[ 7, Ex. E). The School District denied 
the PEA and Richards' grievance both at the initial step and each subsequent step of the 
grievance process. (Id., q/qj 7-11, Exs. E through I). The School District's sole reason for 
denying Richards professional leave and/or refusing to reclassify the personal leave to 
professional leave was that Richards' defense of his Master's final project did not constitute 
professioual leave under the tenns of the Master Agreement. (Id., 7 1, Ex. E, and 79 ,  Ex. 2 and 
7  1 I, Ex. I; Amdavit of John E. Rumel in Support of Plail~tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgrne~lt, 
f 2, Ex. A). In reaching its collclusion, the School Board rejected -- and, indeed, did not even 
address -- the PEA'S argument that, because Richards' leave to defend his Master's final project 
furthered his professiolzal development and would be beneficial to the School District, the Board 
should reclassify Richards' leave from personal leave to professional leave under the Master 
Agreement. (Id., 77 10 and I I,  Exs. B and I). 
On October 11, 2007, the PEA u ~ d  Richards, through their representatives, informed the 
School District that the PEA and Richards intended to pursue litigation coricevning the grievance, 
but would forego doing so if the School District agreed to resolve the matter through binding 
arbitration. ( I d  2 )  By letter, dated October 12, 2007, the School District declined the PEA 
and Richards' invitation to resolve the matter through an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism. (Id., 7  12, Ex. J). 
This lawsuit ensued. 
-- - -----. - --x 
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111. ARGUMENT 
A. Under the Standard for Evaiuatiug Motions for Summary Judgment, the PEA and 
Richards' Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Granted. 
The s m n a r y  judgment standard is well-hil iar  to this Court: ' ' [s lm~ary judgment 
ust be entered when the 'pleadings, depositions, and the admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), quoted in 
Friel v. Boise City Housing Aulhovigi, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If 
reasoliable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference fioni the 
evidence, then the motion should be denied. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195, 30 P.3d 
I 970, 973 (2001). If, however, the record presents no genuine issue of material fact, the nioving 
I 
party's motion must be granted. Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 226 Idaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 
4 
1223, 1226 (1995). Specifically, where the facts are not in dispute, the questioll of whether a 
I 
defendant breached a contract by failing to perfonn is a question of law which should be 
resolved by t l ~ e  court. Austin v. Brown Brothers Co., 30 Idaho 267, 173-174, 164 P. 95, 97 
(1917); see also Figuevoa v. Kit-Sun Co., 123 Idaho 149, 158, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct. App. 
In addition, "where the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a 
jury will be the trier of fact, sumnary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict 
between those inferences." Jenln'ns v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202,205, 177 P.3d 949, 952 (2008); 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Nut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 142 Idaho 489, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 
I (2006); Favnev v. Idaho Falls School Disl. No. 91, 135 Iddlo 333,340, 17 P.3d 281, 284 (2000) 
Thus, where the Court will be the trier of fact, it "is entitled to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it aild grant sunnnary judgment, 
-- - -----.. ,-x r n n  A x m r m x  r n ~  C T I D D n a T  nF MOTTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 I 000655 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences," JR.  Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Ida110 611,615, 
167 P.3d 748, 752 (2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999), or, 
in other words, when the court would sit without a jury, the court may draw the inferences it 
would be allowed to draw fiom the evidence at trial. Drew v. Souensen, 133 Idaho 534, 537,989 
P.2d 276,279 (1999); WzZZc'ams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967, 
969 (1993). Under these circumstances and applying these principles, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has affrvmed a trial court's decision at summary judgment concerning the interpretation of a 
contract ge~~erally, JR.  Simplot Co., I44 Idaho at 615-616, 167 P.3d at 752-73; see also 
Favnsworth v. Dairymerz's Creamery Association, 125 Idaho 866, 868-871, 876 P.2d 148, 150- 
153 (Ct. App. 1994), and, specifically, concemilzg teacher employment contracts, including a 
collective bargaining agreement entered into between a schooI district and a local education 
association. Favner, 135 Idaho at 340-341, 171 P.3d at 284-285.' 
Under the standards set fort11 above, and as discussed more fully below, the PEA and 
Richards are entitled to judgme~zt as a matter of law on their breach of contract claims in their 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. 
B. The PEA and Richards are Entitled to Summary Judgment on their First Claim for 
Relief for Breach of the Master Agreement. 
1. Under well-settled rules of contract interpretation, Richards was entitled to 
use a professional leave day, an& should not have been forced to use a 
personal leave day, to travel to and defend his final project for his Master's 
Degree in Education. 
The Professional Leave provision agreed to by the PEA and the School District in their 
first Master Agreement and agreed to without change for their Master Agreement for the 2006- 
2007 and 2007-2008 school years was quoted above and bean repeating here: 
' Co~rte~nporaneous with the filing of their motion for sumnary judgment, tlxe PEA and Richards have filed a motion 
to strike the School District's demand for .hial by jury. Because the relief sought by the PEA is entirely equitable 
nature, the PEA'S motioil to strike is well taken. As such, the Court (not a jury) will be the tiier of fact in this case. 
o uo  o.s7'a 
- -  - 
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ProfessionaI Leave 
Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other schools is permitted at full 
pay if such absence is approved by' the Principal. If any certificated personnel 
wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a professional meeting, 
to visit schools, or othenvise pursue professional developmel~t, a written request 
' for approval of such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the 
Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated . 
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed 'two (2) days per y e a  and is non- 
cumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed 
when necessary. 
As this Court is well aware, the primary responsibility of a court in determining the 
requirements of contracts is to ascertain the contracting pa~ies '  intent. Stvaub v. Smith, 145 
Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754,758 (2007); Boel v. Stewart Title Guaranp Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13,43 
P.3d 768, 772 (2002). Where the ternzs of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the cou~t 
should determine their meaning and legal effect from the words of the document viewed as a 
wl~ole. Clear Lake Tvout Co., Irzc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 
443, 446 (2005); SE/Z Const., L.L.C. v. Idaho State Urziversity, 140 Idal~o 8, 12, 89 P.3d 848, 
852 (2004); Opportunip, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002). 
Where, however, a contract is ambiguous, "[tlhe detenuination of the parties' intent is to be 
determined by looking at the col~tract as a whole, the language used in the document, the 
circumstances under wllich it was made, the objective and puvpose of the particular provision, 
and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or 
dealings." J.R. Simplol Co., 144 Idaho at 614, 167 P.3d at 751. A contract will only be 
ambiguous where there are at least two different reasollable interpretations of a contract term or 
the term is nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Const~ucttorz Co., lizc., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 
748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract term is ambiguous must be determined by giving the words 
or phxase used their colnmon or ordinary meaning, Swcinson, 145 Idaho at 63, 175 P.3d at 752, 
ambiguity does not arise merely because a term is not defined in the contract in which it is used, 
Shawver v. tIuclcleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 363-364,694-695 (2004), and a number of 
courts have relied on dictionary defiliitions of contract terms lo determine their meaning. See, 
e g., Swansorz, 145 Idaho at 62, 175 P.3d at 751; National Union Five Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. 
v. Dzxon, 141 Idaho 537, 540, 112 P.2d 825,828 (2005). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also articulated two (2) principles of consh-uction that are 
highly relevant to this case: (1) "where nothing in the context indicates otherwise, words used in , 
one sense in one part of the contract are deemed to have been used in the same sense in another 
part ofthe sane instrument," Bair v. Barvon, 97 Idaho 26, 30, 539 P.2d 578, 582 (1975); and (2) 
in determining the meaning of an ambiguous contractual provision, '"[t]he rule is clear, that a 
contract should be construed most strongly against the party preparing it or employing the words 
concerning which doubt arises'. . . and that 'where is doubtful language in the contract, it will be 
interpreted most strongly against the party who provided that language."' JR.  Simplot Co., 144 
Idaho at 616, 176 P.3d at 753, quoting Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9, 415 
P.2d 48, 51 (1966) and Wervy v. Plzill&s Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 136, 540 P.2d 792, 798 
And, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that the foregoing principles apply to 
collective bargaining agreements, noting that in determining the meaning and effect of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the decisionnlaker should look to "the express provisions of the 
coIlective bargaining agreement . . . as well as the parties' intentions revealed through their 
bargaining history, past practices, rights established under agreements, and other sources of 
contract cons!xuction." Western Const., Iizc. v. Oregon-Southern Idaho and Wyoming District 
Council, etc., 101 Idaho 145, 148,609 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1980). 
Richards' defense of his filial project for his Master's Degree in Educatioli from the 
University of Idaho clearly constituted pursuit of professio~ial development under the 
- 
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unambiguous language of the Professional Leave provisions ill the Master Agreement. In this 
regard, "professional development" is a broad term and is nowhere defined or otherwise limited 
lo specific professiolial development activities in tile Master Agreement. Moreover, in cornmoll 
usage, the word "professional" has been defined to mean "an occupation or vocation requiring 
traiili~ig in the liberal arts or tile sciences and advanced study in a specialized field," Webster's 
I1 New Riverside University Dictionary (1984) at 939, and "develop" means "[tlo realize the 
potentialities of '  or "[tlo aid in the growth of." Id. at 370. Under these definitions, Richards' 
defeiise of his final project for his Master's Degree in Education clearly aided in his growth as a 
I teacher through advanced training. As such, Richards' activities constituted "professional 
development" under the Professional Leave provision of the Master Agreement. 
I A review of the Master Agreement as a whole leads to the same conclusion. In addition 
to using the term "professional development" ill the Professional Leave provision, the Master 
Agreement uses the term "professional growth" in its Salary provisions. In that latter provision, 
the Master Agreement provides that the Salary Schedule appended to the Master Agreement 
"will . . . [s]lirnulate professional growth while in service," (Potter Aff., Ti/ 5-6, Exs. C and D) 
and W e r  establishes a Salary Schedule which keys increases in compensation for School 
Dishict professional employees to their heaving earned advanced degrees, including Master's 
degrees, and obtaining post-Bachelor degree academic credit. (Id). Thus, given that the PEA 
and School Board are presumed to ascribe the same meaning to similar terms used throughout 
the Master Agreement, and given that the tenn "professional growth" is used in the Salary 
Schedule provisions to mean the acquisition of post-Bachelor degrees, including Master's 
Degrees and doctorates, the term "professional development," when used in the Professional 
Leave provisions of the Master Agreement, cleady encolnpasses Richards' defense of his 
Master's Degree final project as the last step toward earning an advanced degree. For a11 of 
~ 0 0 i i ~ O  
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these reasons, the Professional Leave provisions of the Master Agreement u~ambiguously 
required tlie School District to approve Richards' request to use a professional leave day on May 
3, 2007 to travel to Coeur d'Alene to defend his final project. 
Moreover, even if the Professional Leave provision is ambiguous (and it is not), the result 
would be no different. h this regard, requiring the School District to grant Richards professional 
leave under these circunstances would iirrther the purposes of both the Professional Leave and 
salary provisions of the Master Agreement, i.e., to (1) encourage professional developmelit of 
teachers through colitinued education by reinoving barriers, such as loss of personal ~eavk days 
or loss of compensation, when mderteing such activities, and (2) provide illcentives for 
professional growth by rewarding teachers with increased compensation for post-Bachelor's 
degree acquisition. Also, the PEA and School Board's bargaining history reveals that the School 
Board proposed the language of the version of the Professional Leave provisions that ultimately 
ended up in the Master Agreement. In so doing, and by obtaining the PEA'S agreement to allow 
professional leave for certificated personnel who "otherwise pursue professioiial developmelit," 
the School Board avoided the PEA'S proposed broader language, which would have allowed use 
of professional leave for "any personal reason which is not an unavoidable emergency . . .." 
. .. 
Under these circunstances, the Court iliust coilstrue the Professional Leave language strongly 
against the School District, i .e. ,  the pasty who provided the language in the first instance.' 
For all of these reasons, Richards' use of a professional leave day to travel to the 
U~iiversity of Idaho -- Coeur d'A1ene Center to defend his Master's Degree final project fell we11 
within the meaning o f the  term "professional developinent" under the Professional Leave 
Under Idaho statutory law, the state allocation matrix grants school districts additional funding for teachers who 
obtain advanced degrees. See Idallo Code $ 33-1004A. Tl~us, Richards' obtaini~~g his Master's Degree inured to not 
only his and lGs students'educational benefit, but to the financial beneM of the School District as well. 
provisions octhe Master Agreement. This Court should so hold.3 
2. The SEhool District breached the Master Agreement by failing to allow 
Richards to use a professional day to defend his final project for his Master's 
Degree. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a breach of colltract occurs where a party, 
without legal excuse, fails to perform a promise that malces up the whole or part of a contract. 
Independence Lead Mines v, Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 28, 137 P.3d 409, 415 (2006); 
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 710, 52P.3d 848, 855 (2002). 
As discussed above, Richards was entitled to use a Professional Leave day to travel to 
and defend his fi11a1 project for his Master's Degree in Education mder the teuns of the Master 
Agreen~eiit. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Scl~ool District and School Board refused to 
allow Richards to do so. Accordingly, the PEA and Richards are entitled to summary judgment 
on their First Claim for Relief ibr breach of the PEA-School Board Master Agreement. 
C.  Richards is Entitled to Summary Judgment on his Second Claim for Relief for 
Breach of his Individual Employment Contract. 
Richards' employment contract with tile School District for the 2006-2007 school year 
provided in pertinent part as follows: 
8. T l~e  terms of this Contract shall be subject to ameiid~nent and adjnsbnent 
to confolm to applicable terms of the Negotiated Master Colitract 
subsequently executed by the Board of Trustees and the Representative 
Organization for the ensuing year. 
(Richards Aff., 1 1, Ex. A). The Idaho Supreme Court has likewise held that colIective 
bargaining agreements entered into between local education associations and school boards 
niodify and become part of teachers' individual employlnent contracts. Farner, 135 Idaho at 
"Iris conclusion coznporis with the recognition or assuinption by numerous courts and educational institutions tkat 
post-graduate study and scholarly activities, as well as obtaining advanced degrees contributes to the professional 
development or growth of teachers and other professional educators. See, e.g., Ohio Unive~siiy of Olzio CivilRighds 
Commission, 2008 W.L. 625565, *G (Ohio App. 2008), Hancoclcex ?el. Hancock v. D~iscoll, 2004 W.L. 877984, *7 
(Mass. Super. 2004); Tippecanoe Ed Ass 'n v. Board of School Trustees of Tippecanoe School Corp., 429 N.E.2d 
967,968 (Iild. App. 1982); Weightnzan v. CIR. ,  1982 W.L. 10967 (1982). 
000062 
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341, 17 P.2d at 285; Buhl Ed. Ass'n v. Joint SchoolDist. No. 412, 101 Idaho l6,22-23, 607 P.2d 
As discussed above, the School District and School Board breached the Professional 
Leave provision of the Master Agreement by refusing to allow Richards to use a professional 
leave day lo defend his final project for his Master's Degree. Because the Master Agreement 
modified and became part of Richards' individual employment contract with the School Disti-ict, 
the Sctiool District and School Board's breach of the Master Agreement constituted a breach of 
Richards' individual employment contract as well. 
D. The PEA and Richards are Entitled to the Declaratory and Equitable Relief Solrght 
in the Prayer for Relief in their Con~plaint. 
1. The PEA and Richards are entitled to declaratory relief. 
Idaho Code 5 10-1201 authorizes district courts to issue declaratory judgments, providing 
as follows: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have 
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or 
not f~n-ther elief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding 
shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory 
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations 
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
Specifically, Sections 10-1202 and 10-1203 provide for a declaratory judgment 
coilcerning a person's rights or obligations under a contract, providing ill pertinent part as 
follows: 
Any person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a . . .contract 
may have determined any question of constr~ction or validity 
arising under the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder. 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a 
breach thereof. 
Idaho appellate courts have made clear that the foregoing statutes authorize the entry of 
aratory judgment to settle disputes regarding the rights and status of perso~s affected by 
ts. Utah Power- & Light Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n., 112 Idaho 10, 12, 730 
P.2d 930,932 (1986); Student Loan Fund ofldaho, Jnc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 825, , 
875 P 2d 236,237 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Applying the above-discussed statutory autllority, the PEA and Richards are entitled to 
declaratory orders stating that the School District breached the Master Agreement and 
Richards' individual employ~lent contract by refusing Richards' request to use a professio~lal 
leave day to defend his Master's final project and declaring Richaxds' right to equitable relief. 
2. The PEA and Richards are Entitled to Equitable Relief. 
Courts of equity will enforce contracts, absent a coinpelli~lg reason to do otherwise. 
Williams v. Continental L f e  & Accident Co., 100 Idaho 71, 74, 593 P.2d 708, 711 (1979); 
Quayle v. Maclcert, 92 Idaho 563, 569-570, 447 P.2d 679, 685-686 (1968). Tlius, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that, "[wlllere a court of equity is asked to enforce a cove~lault by 
ordering specific performance and granting an injunction to prevent a breach of it, equitable 
principles will prevail and the rules of fair dealing and good conscience must be applied." 
Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 148, 350 P.2d 348, 351 (1960), quoted in Dvong V. Coulthard, 87 
Idaho 486,496,394 P.2d 283,289 (1964). 
As alluded to above, the PEA and Richards are entitled to equitable relief ordering the 
School District to reclassify the personal leave day granted to Richards to defend his Master's 
final project as a professional leave day and ordering the School District to restore a personal 
leave day to Richards' account 
000064; 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, the PEA and Richards are (I) entitled to a 
determination as a matter of law that the School District breached the PEA-School Board Master 
Agreement and Richards' individual employment contract by refusing to allow Richards to use a 
professional leave day to travel to and defend his final project for his Master's Degree in 
Education at the Uiiiversity of Idaho and (2) entitled to declaratory and equitable orders 
requiring the School District to treat Richards' absence from school for that purpose as 
professio~lal eave, rather than persolla1 leave. 
94361 DATED this -- day of May, 2008. 
1;DAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Education 
Association and Doug Richards 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the Tky of May, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
Hand Delivered 
to: 
Brian I<. Julian, Esq. 
Davis VanderVeide, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fiffh Sheet, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-5510 
John E.Rume1, Esq. 
I D ~ O  EI~UCATION ASSOCLATION 2008 RAY 1 2 At4 18: 42 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 CLERK OF DiSTRICT CVJf??' 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James M. Piotrowslti, E s ~ .  
71 3 West Franklin Stxeet 
p.0. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 331-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
Attorneys for Plaintzffs 
W THE DISTRICT COURr OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COIJNTY OF L A T m  
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 1 ) Case No. CV2007-1151 
plaintiff, 
V. 
1 ) AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG RICHARDS 
) 1 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY / 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) JUDGMENT 
285, aid BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRlCT NO. 1 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF I D m O  
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 
I, DOUG R I C H W S ,  having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows: 
1. 1 am employed as a teacher in Defendant Potlatch School Dis t~ct  N O  285 
(''School District") aid have held that position from the 1992-1993 school year to the present. 
Attached as Exlribit "A" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of my 
Teachers' Standnrd Contract with the School District for the 2006-2007 
2. In late-April, 2007, I made a request in writing to my building 
permission to use a professional leave day to travel to and defend my final p 
Master's Degree in Education from the University of Idaho -- Coeur d'Ale11e Center 
3. On May 3, 2007, I did, in fact, travel &om Potlatch to Coeur d'Alene and 
defended my final project for my Master's Degree. The School District, however, rather than 
granting my request for professional leave, infonned me that I would have to take a persolla1 
leave day in order to defend my final project. True and correct copies of a Certified Employee 
Absence Report and the School District's response to my request for professional leave are 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively, and incorporated by this 
reference. 
4. During the 2006-2007 school year, I requested use of two (2) professional leave 
days for absences' that I believed qualified for professional leave purposes, one of which was to 
defend my Ella1 Master's project at the University of Idaho - Coeur d'Alene Center on May 3, 
2007. Although I was absent from school or my classroom during the 2006-2007 school year for 
other reasons, such as illness, bereavement or attending music events with my students 
(rehearsals, Christmas programs or music prograins outside of Potlatch), those absences were 
either covered by siclc leave, personal leave or bereavement leave or involved performing my job 
duties, including supervising students. 
4. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called 
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as a witness, could and would competently and truthfully testify to such matters. 
23 
EXECUTED This q day of May, 2008, in the city of Cceur d'Alene, County of 
4 SUBSCRBED AND SWORN To before me this 3day of May, 2008. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG RICBARIB It? SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .WDGh.IENT - 3 
I 000069 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY Thai on the *aY of May, 2008, L caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
Hard Deiivered 
to: 
Amy Wl~ite, Esq. 
Andersou, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
FacsiiniIe: 344-55 20 
IEA REGION 2 , PAGE 02 
RiIS COVfRACr, made this ist day of June yoar of 2006, by and between Potlatch schaol D i s h i d  No. 285, 
Potlatch, Idaho ("the Distrlci"J and D o ~ g l a s  J. Rfchards ("the Teacher"). 
VGnNESSETH: 
1. The District nereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Idaho Code 3 33-515 for the duration of the 2006-2007 scilool 
year, consisting of a period of 290 days, and agrees to pay the TeacR~ii. for said services a sum of FORV-MINE 
THOUSAND SIX HUUDREL) FIFTY-FOUR- Potiars ($ 49.654 ) of which 1/12  shall be payable on the last day 
of tI,s months September year of 2006 to August year of 2007 lncluslve, and such other monetary benefits as 
accorded tol ls celtiflcated employees by the Dlstrid. 
Base Sslaty - $ 49.654 
Placement on the salary schedule: Education Experience ^ 15__ 
2. ?'eatiiingasslgnment(s): , EIe~nenta~~SecondawM~sic~T~cher' -, 
and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for whlcli the Teacher Is properly certified and endorsed. 
3. TheTeacher agrees to petfom all te-aclling assignments rnade by the District in accordance wlth the highest profe~~lonal  
star?dards 2nd to lhave and malntaln the legal qualifications required to teach In tile afarsold grades or subjects during ali 
tlrnes that performance is required hereunder, 
4, I? Is understood and agrqed between the parties that this Contract is subyect to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho, 
the duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the Policies of the District which are, by reference, 
Incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fu! !~ set forth herein. 
5. Any material False statement knowingly rnade in the writ:;" appi1ca:ion for a position wlth the District shali constitute 
sufficient ground for volding this Contract. 
6. Any person signing a contract for a fourth consecutivF full school yew shall be piaced'on a renewable contract status 
pursuant to Section 33-515, Idaho Code. 
7. It is mut~al ly understood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be 
construed as a waiver of any of the rlglits, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of 
the Stare of Idaho, except as expressly stated in this Contract. 
6 .  The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to applicable terms of the 
Negotiated Master Contmct subsequently executed by the Board of Trustees and the Reereseniative Organization for the 
ensutng year. 
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John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAT30 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
James M. Piotrowski, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
KERZFELD & PIOTROWSIU, LLP 
71 3 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 331-9200 
Facsinlile: (208) 33 1-9201 
CLEHK OF DiSmiCT Ci)!j;ij 
LZ4T,4)< C;QUf,,jjJ' 
Attorneys for PlaintifSs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDrUIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAK 
POTLATCEI EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHI\RDS, 1 
) Case No. CV2007-1151 
Plaintiff, 
v. I 
POTLATCEI SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, andBOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 
285, ) 
1 
Defendants. 
STATE OF lDAKO 1 
) ss. 
County of Ada 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN E. RUMEL 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I, JOHN E. RUMEL, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practiced law in the State of Idaho and represent 
a U O O G ~ ~ 4  
AFFTDAVIT OF JOWN E. RUMEL W SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .IUDGMENT - 1 
Plaintiffs Potlatch.Education Association ("PEA") and Doug Richards in the above-encaptioned 
action. 
2. Attached as Exhibit "A" and iilcorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of excerpts s' Response to Plaintiffs' s for Production of 
Documents, Request EA and Richards by 
Defendants Potlatch School District No. 285 and Board of Trustees, District No' 
285 (collectively, "School District$ on April 18, 2008. 
3 1 have pnsonal lmowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called 
as a witness, could and would competently and tmthfully testify to such matters. 
EXECUTED This p d a y  of May, 2008, in the City of Boise, County of Ada, State of 
Idaho 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOI-XN E. RUMEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR S U M M M  JUDGMENT -84 0 0 .j 5 
CERTXFlLCATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY That on the m a y  of May, 2008,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transinission 
Hand Delivered 
to: 
Brian K. Juiian, Esq. 
Davis VanderVelde, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Ilull, LLP 
C. W. Moorc Plaza 
250 South FiBli Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-55 10 
John E. Rumel 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN E. RUMEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENX - Q qj 0 0 "7 6 
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 501 9 
Mark D. Sebastian - ISB No. 601 2 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
W. Moore Plaza 
0 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
st  Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208)  344-5800 
Facsimile: (208)  344-551 0 
all: m a j h l a w . c o m  
awhite@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, Anderson Julian 
& Hull, LLP and hereby answers and responds to Plaintiffs' First lnterrogatones and 
Plaintiffis), 
vs. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285, 
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285, 
Defendant(s1. 
Requests for Production as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, AND 
INTERROGATORIES. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -1 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations of said request. 
leave day as professional leave. 
RESPORSE: The t ime was denied as professional leave because the basis 
for the request did not constitute professional leave as envisioned by  the Master 
Agreement. Defendant reserves the right t o  supplement. 
lNTERROGATORY NO. 2: As  to  any and all of the above requests for 
admissions thar you did not  respond t o  wi th  an unequivocal admission, please state 
all fact upon which you based your response. . , 
RESPONSE: Please see responses t o  Requests for Admissions. 
ilVTERROGATORY 1\10. 3: Please state all facts upon which you  base your 
denial of paragraph 5 of the PEA'S and Richard Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Within the Complaint the Plaintiff has characterized the request 
as one for professional leave. The leave requested should not  becharacterized as 
professional leave, but instead should be characterized as personal leave. 
INTERROGATORY 1\10. 4: Please state all facts upon which you base your 
Denial of the PEA'S and Richard's allegation in paragraph 6 o f  their Complaint that 
"[tlhe School District denied the PEA and Richards' grievance, both a t  the initial 
level and each subsequent step of the grievance process." 
RESPONSE: As written the subject paragraph appears t o  allege that Mr .  
Richards was denied filing of a grievance when in fact  it was the request made 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -5 
pocket c o s t s  t o  Mr. Richards. Defendant reserves t h e  right to supplement. 
? 5' 
DATED this  & day of April, 2008. 
ANDERSON JULIAN & H U L  
ttorneys for Defendant 
I 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -7 
April 18,2008 
Pa.ge 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this & day of April, 2008, 1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION by delivering the same to 
each of the following attorneys of record, by method indicated below, addressed as 
follows: 
'John Rumel &< US.  Mail, postage prepaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOC. [ ] Hand-Delivered 
620 n. 6TH Street [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O. BOX 2638 [ ] Facsimile (: (208) 344-1606 
Boise, ID 83701 
i 
James M. Piotrowski &' U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand 1 1 Hand-Delivered 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP [ ] Overnight Mail 
713 W. Franklin St [ ] Facsimile (: (208) 331-9201 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, ID 83701-2864 
______I--- 75- -.. />,"- / Brian K. Julian 
I 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -8 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCLATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telepllone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1 606 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
713 West Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 331-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 331-9201 
Attorneys for PlaintifSs 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDLDhIIO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff, 
- 
v. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, 
1 ) Case No. CV2007-1151 
1 
1 AFFIDAV-IT OF BRIAN POTTER ) IN SUPPORT OF PLATNTIFFS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Latah 1 
I, BRIAN POTTER, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows: 
1. From the 1992-1993 school year to the present, I have been employed as a teacher 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG 
in Defendant Potlatch School ~ is t r ic t  No. 285 ("Scl~ool District"). 
2. From approximately June 2003 to the present, I have served on Plaintiff Potlatch 
Education Association's ("PEA") bargaining teain in its negotiations over collective bargaining 
agreements (denominated "Master Agreements") with Defendant Board of Trustees, Potlatch 
Scl~ool District No. 285 ("School Board"). 
3. Attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of a side-by-side cornparisoil of the School Board's atid the PEA'S respective proposals 
concerning Professioiial Leave (with the School Board's proposals in the left column and the 
PEA'S proposals in the right column) exchanged by the parties during negotiations over a Master 
Agreement for the 2003-2004 school year. 
4. Attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of the parties' tentative agreement on Professional Leave language for the Master 
Agreement, which tentative agreetneiit was reached by the School District and the PEA 011 
August 18,2004. 
5. Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference are true and correct 
copies of excerpts froin the School Board-PEA Master Agreement for the 2003-2004 and 2004- 
2005 school years, which Master Agreement contains the Professional Leave language agreed to 
by the parties in Exhibit "B" above. 
6. Attached as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by this reference are true and co~rect 
copies of excerpts from the School Board-PEA Master Agreement for the 2006-2007 and 2007- 
2008 school years, which Master Agreement contains the same Professional Leave and Salary 
provisions (except for the salary amounts themselves) that were agreed to by the PEA and the 
School Board in their first Master Agreement for the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 school years. 
AFFICAVIT OF BRZAN POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEW - 2 , 
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7. Attached as Exhibit "E" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of Doug Richards and the Potlatch Education Association's ("PEA") Grievance Report 
Form and the School District's Level 1 decision on Richards and the PEA's grievance, both of 
which are dated Ju2e 8,2007. 
8. Attached as Exhibit "F" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of a docur~lent filed by the PEA, dated June 16,2007, and showing receipt by the School 
District 011 June 18, 2007, moving Richards and the PEA'S grievance to the next step of the 
grievance process. 
9. Attached as Exhibit "G" and incorporated by this reference is a hue and correct 
copy of a memo from School District Superintelldent Joseph Kren to the PEA, dated June 19, 
2007, denying Richards and the PEA's grievance at the next step. 
10. Attached as Exhibit "H" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct 
copy of a letter that the PEA presented to the School Board at its June 20, 2007 meeting 
concerning the PEA and Richards' grievance. 
I I. Attached as Exhibit "I" and incorporated by (his reference is a hue and correct 
copy of a letter, dated June 27, 2007, that I received lorn Heidi I,. Davis, Chairperson of the 
School Board, concerning the PEA and Richards' grievance. 
12. On October 11, 2007, Idaho Education Association Region Director Patti Roberts 
and I inet with Superintendent Kren concen~ing the possibility of arbitrating the PEA and 
Richards' grievance. Attached as Exhibit '7" and incorporated by this reference is a true and 
correct copy of a letter, dated October 12,2007, that I received from Chailyerson Davis. 
13. 1 have also been involved in the PEA's bargaining with the School Board over the 
terms of the Master Agreement for the 2008-2009 school year. Attached as Exhibit "K" and 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRLAN POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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i 
incorporated by this refcrmocc is a me and correct copy of the School. Board's proposal 
ooncnning professional lmve language, which proposal was provided by the Sohool Board to the 
PEA on or about Jahuary 14,2008. 
14. X have personal knowledge of the matters set foah in tbis -davit and, if called 
as a witness, could and would competently and t~~tbfully testify to such matters. 
EXECUTED %s - 7day of May, 2008, in thc town of PotIatob, County o f  kt&,  
State of ldabo. 
d 
SUESCiUBED AND SWORN To before me lhis 1- day wFMay, 2008. 
AFFWAVIT OF BRWY POTTER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
~ . . .,. . , . . .. . . ,. . .. . . . . . . , . . . , . , . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 REREBY CERTFY That on the *8ay of May, 2008, 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
% Hand Delivered 
to: 
Amy White, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W, Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-55 10 
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PSD#285 School Board Proposal 2-15-34 
ARTICLE 1 
RECOGNITION 
.- 
PEA Proposed Negotiations Agreement 1-31- 
1.1 Parties and Purpose. This 04 
Agreement is b e h e e n  the Board of Tiustees 
of Potlatch Schooi District285 located in ARTICLE I 
Potlatch, Idaho and in L a t h  County RECOGNITICFI 
(hereinafter "Board") and the Potlatch 
Education Association (hereinafter 1.1 Association Recoaniiion 
"Association") to estab!ish procedures for 
bargaining and the specific items to be The Board of Trustees of School District 
bargained between the parties pursuant to 285, Latah County, Potlatch, Idaho, 
the provisions of Idaho Law. hereinafter referred lo as the Board, 
recognizes Potlatch Education 
1.2 Recognition. The Board Association as the sole and exclusive 
recognizes the Association as the sole and negotiating agentfor all employed 
exclusive negotiating agent for the p7qoses certificated personnel (except 
of negotiations with certificated Professional Superintendent and Principals), 
Employees of the District so long as the - hereinafier referred to and defined as 
Association has the approval oftbe major;,ty . . . . .  . professional employees. 
of the professional employees of the Distiici 
to so represent them. 1.2 Neootiation Exciusivih' 
. . . . . . .  
. .  - . . 
. . 
1. Exclusio~s. . . The Board agrees not to negoiiste with . , . 
foliotr,<ng certiiicated employees of the . . any other employees' organization, . . . 
., . . . .  .  
. . . . . .  District i r e  excluded from representa6on by individual ~rnpioyee, or group of 
- ... . -  the Association: employees, whether under contractor on : 
a. Superintenclefit , , leave, with regard to terms and 
b. Assistat conditions of employment unless 
Superintendent ' -  ' " otherwise provided for in this Agreement 
. . .  c. Principals or unless mutually agreed to by ihe 
d. Vice Principals pariies during the tern of this 
e. Directors Agreemgnt. 
2. Additional Excl~sions 
The following employees are excluded from 
. . . . .  . . . . . .  . the appljcation ofthis conkact: .? 
a. Substitutes 
. . .  . . . . .  . . .  .. - .- - .... - . . .  . . b: - Non-teaching-'- 
Coaches (who may have a teaching 
certificate) 
' ,a&.,rc"* 
: -,*, ,,. - .&*~-~~.*-*-'"-~: 
M c d C o l u ~ ~ s B ~ r ? E . A .  Position 2-!24$ - 1 -  
. . . . . . . . .  
. . 
10 3 Immediate Family Illness/ 
Funeral Leave. Upon approval of the 
Superintendent or designee, certificated 
shall be granted ieave of absence 
at fuil pay for serious illness in the 
immediate family (spouse, children, brother, 
. - 
sister, mother and father) or to attend a 
funeral for a spouse, child, brother, brother- 
in-law, sister, sister-in-law, mother, mother- 
in-law, father, or father-in-law not to exceed 
three (3) days per year. This leave is non- 
cumulative. 
10.4 Personal Leave. 'Upon , . . 
: , ~ f  the building principal, 
. , .  : ;I' / : rd personnel shall be granted leave 
: at full pay for personal business. 
not exceed three (3) 
day or days of 
9 , ;  .;. :save may be grmted (with 
.:-:r itive approval) with the stipulation 
that the teacher pay for hisher own . .. . 
substitute teacher at the current substitute F: . . . , .. . . . . 
rate of pay. 
. . , . .. 
10.5 Professional Leave. . .. 
Attendance at educational meetings or 
- ,. 
. . 
visiting other schools is permitted at N 1  pay 
. , .. if such absence is approqed by the .. . , . 
Superintendent. If any teacher wishes to be - 
absent from duty for a brief period to attend .I 
a professional meeting or workshop, to visit 
schools, or otherwise pursue professionaj 
developmeni, .a -&#en-reqxest-for-appreval . . 
of such absence should be signed by the 
principal and filed in the superintendent's 
office at least ten (10) working days prior to . 
the first day of anticipated absence. 
Professiond leave is not to exceed two (2) 
days per year and is noncumulative. 
, . . , . - . . .
. .~ 
5.3 Immediate Family Illness 
Certified personnel shall be granted 
leave of absence at full pay for serious 
illness in the immediate family (spouse, 
children, brother, sister, mother and 
father) not to exceed three (3) days per 
year. This leave is non-cumulative. 
5.4 Funerals 
Ceitified personnel shall be granted 
ieave of absence at full pay to attend 
funerals, not to exceed three (3) days per 
year. This leave is non-cumulative. 
5.5 Peisonal Leave 
Certified personnel shall be granted leaveof 
absence a1 full pay for business that cannot be 
conducted when school is not in session. This 
allowance shall not , exceed :.,,..l.,c, three . (3)  days per 
year and is non-cuinulative.';~ . . 
. . .. 
. . 
An additional day or dais of personal leave m i y  
be granted (with building administrative approval) 
with the stipuiati& that the teacher pay hiskei 
own substitute teacher at the cuneni substitu!? 
rate of pay. 
5.6 Professional Leave 
Attendance at educational meetings or 
visiting other schools is permitted at iull 
pay if-&ch absenaeis-appreved-by the 
principal. li any supervisor, principal, 
teacher, or other employee wishes to be 
absent irom duty for a brief period to 
attend a professional meeting, lo visit 
schools, or for any personal reason 
which is not an'unaqoi'dable emergency, 
a written ,.-.-,:.,.!,i,.!, request for approval of such -. 
absence should.be signed by the 
principal and filed in the superintendent's 
office at least bio (2) days piioi to the 
first day of anticipated absence. 
I 
I per year is non-cumulative. The pady requesting tlie leave must provide 24 hours 
notice to the building principal. 
Employees who extend personal leave beyond the three (3) days will have 1 /190~  
of their cojitkact pa$ deducted from their salary. 
I 
I 1 
10.5 ~rofessional Leave. Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other 
S C ~ O O ~ S  is permia;fa at full pay ifi~such absence is apprc~red by the Priccipd. Lf any 
certificated per,$o&e1piishes io  be absent'from duty for a brief period to attend a 
professional meet&, .to visit schools, or otherwise pusue profeseional development, a. 
written request foi&pproval of such absence should-be signed by the Principa1,and 5Ied 
in the Superhtendent's . . , . .  office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of atiticipated 
absence.' Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is noncumulative. 
The Principal may make e%~ep.tions on the n~~inber of days allowed when necessary. 
10.6 Jufv JhtydhGlitary Service Leave. 
1. JU&DU'~V. Teachers in the Potlatch School Diiiffct shall be excu.sed for 
jury duty, While on jury duiy; an employee is to receive fuli pzy &on1 the school . 
. , I ?  <;,:,,:.'.', district k u s  Zhe amount they receive for services they render on jury duty. 
~ n i p l o ~ k ~ i  ig&l'L;eep reimbursement for mileage. 
MIitarV Service: 2. .- 
A. Employees who are members of the Armed Forces Reserve 
or the ~atiopal'8k~rd(s) hall be granted m i l i t q  leaves of absence if called intb 
service. Whil6,on ... :> .., leave, . the employee shall retainall beneEts, seniority 
. . . . . ~~d.incrementaLadIjan~.ement.as..though~empIo-yment. had.b.e.en.c.~nu~o~s.incbe~~. . . . . . 
district. uponrr% &om leave, the employee shall be placed in the position last 
held or a simil8jWsitiotiin the district. , . 
B. Any bargaining unit member who is a member of a branch . 
. . .  ..,, . ,:, 
of the b e d p & c e s  Res'enii or the National Guard(s) sballbe paid the difference 
- , :,; ,'.8.<2 between hi&k&r RC~~&&/GUU~ pay and the regular p@ heishe would receive 
from the employer diring any period when the &ected bqaining unit meniber 
.,: . i  :,..:: . , 
. . engages in . .  tra&Upg . . , m tlie Reserves or 'Nat iod @ard(s). 
.. . 
10.7' &&i~fidfi Leave. Should the Association send representatives to local, 
state or national i:dnfer&nees or on oSber,business pertinent to  Association affairs, a e s e  
representatives 'desi&i&d by the Association shall be excused without loss of salary for 
up to three (3) days with aggregate total of eight (8) days of Association leave per year 
with all substitute dosts id be provided by the Association, A written notice for leave 
shall have beep subrhitted .to the PriilcipaI at least two (2) days prior to the date of the 
requested leave. Employees who wish to extend Association Ieave may use personal 
ove. 
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For 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 
Between the 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
hn affiliate of the 
Idaho Education Association 
'\ 
And the 
National Education Association 
AND THE 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRlCT NO. 285 
ARTICLE I 
RECOGNITION 
1.1 Pwies and~urpose. This Agreement is between the Board of Trustees of 
Potlatch School ~ i s t r i c t  285 located in Potlatch, Idaho and in Latah County (hereinafter 
"Board" and the Potlatch Education Association (hereinafter "Association") to establish 
procedures for bargaining and the specific items to be bargained between the parties 
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Law. 
1.2 . Recognition.. The Board recognizes the Associatioa as'the sole and 
exclusive negotiating agent for the purposes of negotiations with certificated Professional 
Employees of the District so long as the Association has the approval of the majority of'  
" ~ - tbr:.,pr~fkssiand~mplo.~ees..offthee.eDii~t~.ct-t~.Os~-~ePre~ent~~1.hem~- 
1. Exclusions. The following cerlifica~ed employees of the District 
are excluded from representation by the Association: 
a. Superintendent 
b. Assistant Superintendent 
c. Principals 
d. Vice Principals 
e. Directors 
2. Additional Exclusions The following employees are excluded 
fiom the application of this contract: 
a. Substitutes 
b. Non-teaching Coaches (who may have a teaching certificate) 
1.3 Certification. Should the Board for good cause or 35% of the Professional 
Employees request, the Association will conduct an election by represented Professional 
Employees, by secret ballot to determine whether or not the Association has majority 
approval to represent the Professional Employees. A Board representative and an 
Association representative shall be allowed to observe the balloting unless bolh parties 
agree to waive their right. The Board and the Association shall each appoint one 
representative to count the ballots and report the election results. 
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10.4 Personal Leave. Upon approval of the building administrator, certificated 
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay for business that cannot be 
conducted when school is not in session. This allowance shall not exceed three (3) days 
per year and is non-cumulative. T l ~ e  party requesting the leave must provide 24 hours 
notice to the building principal. . 
Employees who extend personal leave beyond the three (3) days will have 111 90"' 
of their contract pay deducted &om their salary. 
10.5 Professional Leave. Attendance at educational meetings or visiting other 
schools is permitted at full pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If any 
ceriificatedpersonnel~wishes to be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a 
professional meeting, to visit schools, or otherwise pursue professional development, a 
written request for approval of such absence should be signed by ihe Principal and filed 
in the Superintendent's office at least two (2) days prior to the first day of anticipated 
absence. Professional leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is nonc&nulative. 
The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when necessary. 
10.6 Jury DutyMilitary Service Leave. 
1. Jurq Duty. Teachers in the Potlatch School District shall be excused for 
jury duty. While on jury duty, an employee is to receive full pay from t l ~ e  school 
diswict minus the amount they receive for services they render on jury duty. 
Einployees shall keep reimbursement for mileage. 
2. Military Service: 
A. Employees who are members ofthe h ~ e d  Forces Reserve 
or the National Guard(s) silali be granted military leaves of absence if called into 
service. While on leave, the einployee shall retain all benetits, seniority 
and incremental advancement as tlzough employment had been continuous in the 
district. Up011 return from leave, the employee shall be placed in the position last 
held or a similar position in the disirict. 
B. Any bargaining unit member who is a member of a branch 
of the h e d  Forces Reserve or the National Guard(s) shall be paid the difference 
between kisiher ReserveIGuasd pay and Che,regular pay heishe would receive 
from the employer during any period when the affected bargaining unit member 
engages in training in the Reserves or National Guard(s). , . 
10.7 Association Leave. Should the Association send representatives to local, 
state or national conferences or on other business pertinent to Association affairs, these 
representatives designated by the Association shall be excused without loss of saIary for 
up to three (3 j days w?t an aggregate total of eight (8) days of Association leave per year 
with all substitute costs to be provided by the Association. A written notice for ieave 
shall have been submitted to the Pri~~cipaI t least two (2) days prior to the date of the 
requested leave. Employees who wish to extend Association leave may use personal 
leave as stated in Section 10.4 above. 
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ARTICLE XV 
SALARY 
15.1 Salary Schedule. 
l .  The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for the several 
professional positions in the school district ihat will: 
A. Attract to this school district the best candidates available. 
B. Give stability to the professional staff. 
C. Stimulate professional growth while in service. 
2. Teachers who work part time for this school district or a fractional port~on of the 
normal 190 full-day contract shall be given a corresponding fractional proportion of ihe 
yearly increment. 
3 When a teacher assurnes a full 190-day contract position, all fractional years of 
service for th is  scliool district shall be added, and the sum shall reflect increment 
placement on the salary schedule. All remainders shall be treated as a full-year 
mcrement. For example: A teacher w11o teaches half-lime for three (3) years would be 
credited with two (2) years upon accepting a full-time job. 
4. Definition of Credit: Tbe salary schedule shall be a semester unit schedule 
Conversion of quarter credits to semester units shall be on a 213 computation. 
5. Definition of Unacceptable Course Work: Courses which have been (a) taken for 
audit; (b) repeated courses; (c) taken at non-accredited institutions; and, (d) failed or 
listed as incomplete are not acceptable for advancement. 
6 .  Verification of Earned Credits: Official transcripts from the granting university or 
college are fAe only acceptable verification of earned credits. Transcripts must be 
received by the admiicstration not later than 0ctober 1 for advancement unless otherwise 
by the administration. 
7.  Advancement on the Salary Schedule by New Employees: Only those credits 
earned after the date of teacher certification or award of a Bachelor Degree in Education 
will be acceptable for salary advancement. 
8. The salary schedule shalI be in effect as set fort11 iil Appendix A for the 2003- 
2004 school year. The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix 
C fiom September i ,  2004 though December 3 i, 2004. The salary schedule shall 
be in effect as set forth in Appendix D fioin Jsuiuary 1,2005 through August 3 1, 
2005. 
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iT 
' APPENDIX A 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285 
.... 
................... *...." .-.v...- . mr+ 16.*o. i". . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  
TEACHER SALARYSCHEDULE 2003-2004 
PKu, + 32 MA O r  t lA '  
~~ . 
E X P  BA Or B S  B A t  16 + 32 . . . .  . . . . .  BA + 48 Or BA+ 64 i 
. . . .  . . .  : . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  
. . . .  
. . 
. . 
, 
. . 
1 - 1.000 $24,002 1.045 $25,082 : 1.090 $26,162 ' 1.135 $27,242 ; 1.180 $28,322 
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MASTER AGREEMENT 
For 2006-2007 
between the 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
an affiliate of the 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
." 
and the 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
and the 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
ARTICLE I 
RECOGNITION 
1 .1 Parties and Purpose 
This Agreement is between the Board, o f  Trustees of Potlatch School 
District 285 located in Potlatch, ldaho and in Latah County (hereinafter 
inafter .. -".-~ "Association") ..... 
ic i tems to be 
bargained between the parties pursuant to the provisions o f  ldaho Law. 
1.2 Recosnition 
The Board recognizes the Association as the sole and exclusive 
negotiating agent for the purposes of negotiations with certificated 
Professional Employees of the District so long as the Association has the 
approval of  the majority of the professional employees o f  the District to 
so represent them. 
1. Exclusions 
The following certificated employees of the District are excluded 
from representation by the Association: 
a. Superintendent 
b. Assistant Superintendent 
c. Principals 
d. Vice Principals 
e. Directors 
2. Additional Exclusions 
ARTICLE Vlll 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
1. A grievance shall be defined as a written allegation of  a violation, 
misinterpretation or misapplication of the terms of this Agreement. 
grievance is  submitted less than ten (1 0) days before the close of 
the current school term, time limits shall consist of  all weekdays in 
order that the matter may be resolved before the close of the 
school term or as soon thereafter as possible. School days for the 
purposes of the grievance procedure shall mean teacher 
employment days. 
3. Grievances shall not be denied based upon the degree of 
completeness o f  the grievance form. (Appendix B) 
8.2 Riahts to Representation 
At  least one (1) Association representative shall be present at any 
meeting, hearing, appeal, or other proceeding relating to  a grievance 
which has been formally presented. Nothing contained herein shall be 
construed as limiting the right of  any employee having a grievance to 
discuss the matter informally with the supervisor and having the 
grievance adjusted without intervention of  the Association, provided the 
Association has been notified and the adjustment is not inconsistent with 
the terms of this agreement. 
8.3 Procedure 
The parties acknowledge that it is usually most desirable for an employee 
and the immediately involved supervisor t o  resolve problems through 
free and informal communications. When requested by the employee, the 
building representative may accompany the teacher to'assist in the 
formal resolution of the grievance. If, however, such informal processes 
fail to satisfy rhe teacher or the Association, a grievance may be 
processed as follows: 
1 .  The employee or the Association may present the grievance in 
writing (using Appendix 6) w.jthin fifteen ( 1  5) calendar days dfthe 
incident giving rise to the grievance r@ the supervisor immediately 
involved who will arrange for a meeting to take place within four (4) 
days after receipt of the grievance. The Association's 
representative, the aggrieved employee, andthe immediately 
involved supervisor shall be present for the meeting. i h e  
supervisor shall provide a written answer to the grievance to the 
aggrieved employee and the Association within two (2) days after 
the meeting. This answer shall include the reasons for the 
decision. 
2. If the grievance is not resolved at Step No. 1, then the Association 
shall refer the grievance to the superintendent or the 
superintendent's official designee within six (6) days after the 
receipt of the Step No. 1 answer. The superintendent shall arrange 
for a meeting with the grievant and his/her representatives to take 
place within four (4) days o f  hislher receipt of  the appeal. The 
superintendent shall provide a written answer to the grievance to 
the aggrieved employee and the Association within two (2) days 
after the meeting. This answer shall include the reasons for the 
decision. 
3.  if thegrievance is not resolved at Step No. 2, then the Association 
$b${[ ?@yer the gii&&ficc to f h k  Bigrd :of Trustees within six (6) days 
after the receipt of  the Step No. 2 answer. The Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees shall arrange for a meeting with the grievant and 
his/her representatives to take place within four (4) days of hisiher 
receipt of the appeal. The Chairman of the Board of  Trustees shall 
provide a written answer to the grievance to  the' aggrieved 
employee and the Association within two (2) days after the 
meering. This answer shall include the reasons for the decision. 
8.4 Procedure Ev-Pass 
Grievances involving the Superintendent, o r  grievances involving 
decisions made by the Board, maybe initially filed by the Association at 
Step No. 2.  
8.5 Riqht to Representation b~ Grievant 
The Board acknowledges the right of the Association's grievance 
representative to participate in the processing of a grievance at any of the 
three Steps described above, and no employee shall be required to 
discuss any grievance if the Association's representative i s  not present. 
8.6 Riqht to Re~resentation bv Association 
When an employee is  not represented by the Association, the Association 
shall have the right to have its representative present at any stage of the 
grievance procedure only when the grievance specifically addresses an 
issue regarding this Master agreement. Non-members may not be 
refused the right to Association representation if they so request. 
8.7 Grievance lnvestiqation 
The Board and the administration shall cooperate with the Association in 
its investigation of any grievance within the limits established by Idaho 
law. 
8.8 Non-Reprisal Clause 
No reprisals of  any kind shall be taken by the Board or the administration 
against any employee because of the employee's participation in this 
grievance procedure. 
8.9 Released Time for Grievance Administration 
Should the investigation or processing of any grievance require that an 
employee or an Association representative be released from hislher 
regular assignment, said employee and/or representative shall be 
released without loss of pay or benefits. 
8.1 0 Grievance Files 
All documents, communications, and records dealing with the processing 
of a grievance shall be filed separately from the personnel files of the 
participants. 
8.1 1 Withdrawal of Grievances 
A grievance may be withdrawn at any level without establishing 
precedent. 
10.3 Farnilv IilnessIFuneral Leave 
1. Immediate Familv Illness 
Upon proper notification to the building administrator, certificated 
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay for serious 
illness in their immediate family (spouse, children, brother, sister, 
mother and father) not to exceed three (3) days per year. This 
leave is non-cumulative. Upon exhaustion of family leave, 
certificated personnel may utilize their available sick leave if 
needed. 
2. Funerals 
Upon proper notification to the building administrator, certificated 
personnel shall be granted leave of absence at full pay to attend 
funerals, not to exceed three (3) days per year. This leave i s  non- 
cumulative. 
10.4 Personal Leave 
Upon approval o f  the building administrator, certificated personnel shall 
be granted leave of absence at full pdyfor business  hat cannot be 
con..&&tc$ fkrhgh s.th.6ol 1s (iot.in $@ss.i~fi: This allowance shall not 
exceed four (4) days per year. Each certifitated employee may carry 'to 
the next school year, up to one (1) personal leave day. Aggregate total 
for any one year is not to. exceed five (5). ' i h ' . ~  p8pt-y reruesting the leave 
mustp@6$'i& 24 hours notice to the bui1din.g pri.ni.pul. Employees who 
extend personal leave beyond their aggregate total of days will have 
11.1 90th of their contract pay deducted. fromtheir salary. 
10.5 Professional Leave 
personnel wishes to  be absent from duty for a brief period to attend a 
prof@ssinnaf meeting., to visit schools, or otherwise pursue prof6Ssiqnai 
devel~:pment, a written request for approval of such absence S-hbuld be 
signed by the Principal and fried in the Superintendent's office a t leas t  
SW@ (2) - .  days prior to  the first day of anticipated a:bsence. Professional ' . 
leave is not to exceed two (2) days per year and is non-cumulative. The 
Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when 
necessary. 
ARTICLE XV 
SALARY 
15.1 Salarv Schedule 
1. The Board and the Association shall establish a salary schedule for 
the several professional positions in the school district that will: 
A. Attract to this school district the best candidates available. 
6. Give stability to the professional staff. 
C.  Stimulate professional growth while in service. 
2. Teachers who work part time for this school district or a fractional 
portion of the normal 190 full-day contract shall be given a 
corresponding fractional proportion of the yearly increment. 
3. When a teacher assumes a full 190-day contract position, all 
fractional years of service for this school district shall be added, 
and the sum shall reflect increment placement on the salary 
schedule. All remainders shall be treated as a full-year increment. 
For example: A teacher who teaches half-time for three (3) years 
would be credited with two (2) years upon accepting a full-time 
job. 
4. Definition of Credit: The salary schedule shall be a semester unit 
schedule. Conversion of quarter credits to semester units shall be 
on a 213 computation. 
5. Definition of  Unacce~table Course Work: Courses which have been 
(a) taken for audit; (b) repeated courses; (c) taken at non- 
accredited institutions; and (d) failed or listed as incomplete are not 
acceptable for advancement. 
6. Verification of Earned Credits: Official transcripts from the 
granting university or  college are the only acceptable verification of 
earned credits. Transcripts must be received by the administration 
not later than October 1 for advancement unless otherwise 
permitted by the administration. 
7. Advancement on the Salarv Schedule bv New Em~lovees: Only 
those credits earned after the date of teacher certification or award 
of a Bachelor Degree in Education will be acceptable for salary 
advancement. 
8. The salary schedule shall be in effect as set forth in Appendix A. 
APPENDIX A 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285 
POTLATCH, IDAHO 
TEACHER SALARY SCHEDULE 2006-2008 
POTLATCH SCHOOL .m.TST ) 
APPEPSDUL B 
GRKEVANCE REPORT FORM 
Aggrieved Person Potlatch Teacher Date Filed6/7/07 
School Potlatch Elemen~lSenior  Hi& Subject area or Grande Profession$ Leave 
1. Date Grievance Occurred Week of Mav 10" 
2. Statement of Grievance: Doug Ncharcls requestqd that his leave on May 3* be 
considered professional leave. Mr. Kren denied that request and instead classilied 
it as personai leave. 
3. Action Requested ox Relief Sought ( a w h  additional sheet, if necessaxy): We the 
PEA would like to request t b t  Doug Richard's leave on May 3* be considered 
professional instead of personal leave. 
Reasons: Be was using the day to defend and present his final project for fors 
master's in education degree at the University of Idaho in Coeur d' Alene. As per 
our contractual agreement in 10.5, "If any certificated pmsonnel wishes to be 
absent from duty for a brief period .to attmd a professional meeting, to visit 
schools, or otherwise pursue professional development. .." Doug was in the 
putsuit of professional devebpxaent. 
k.;./ 
~iggiiturehf kggieved Date 
LEVEL 1 
V 
2. Aggrieved Person's Rcponse: 
PAGE 03 
Signam of Principal or Immediate Supervisor 
Date 
I accept the above decision. 
\,/ I hereby refer the above? decision to the next s t q  of the grievance 
procedure. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL RTST PAGE 04 
Potlatch School Distticl: No. 285 
130 Sixth St. 
potlatch, ID 83855-8757 
District Office (208)875-0327 
Elementary School (208)875-133 1 
Jr.-Sx. &gh Sohool (208)875-1231 
FAX (208)875-1028 
MEMO To: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
SUBJECT: Grievance - ProfessionaVPersonai Leave 
Thank you for the oppomnity to meet with you on June 18,2007, 1 am writing to inform 
you that &er reviewing the issues concerning ihe Potlatch Education AssociEition's 
grievmce requesting Doug Richards'leave on May 3,2007 is considered professional 
leave instead of personal leave, I am denying said request. 
1 do not believe that defending a final project for one's Master's in Elducational 
Administration comes under the intent of the Professional Development language in our 
current negotiated agreement. 
Mjtdatne Chair and members of the Potlatch School Board: 
We are writing this letter .to you in regard to athird step of a formal grievance on behalf of 
tbe Potlatch Education Association, A grievance may have a negative coanotation that it 
should not. It is ow belief that such a process should be in place so that problems in our 
district need not fester but have o p p o W Q  for We resolution. So, on behdlf of the 
Association, we wish to thank you for tsking your time to consider this co~~tracmal 
disagreement. WhiIe the grievance itself is enclosed, in this letter we wish to add further 
comments to the gzievance up to r h i s  step for your consideration. 
It is our belicftbat Mt. Riohard's absence on May 3 clearly falls within both "the spirit" and 
"htenf' of the professional development "languagem or~"clause" of the cment negotiated 
agreement and we wish to defer14 Mr. Richards' request to have that day recognized as 
professional leave, Mr. Richards did not request any other prof~ssional eave ihroughout the 
year and such leave (as opposed to person& leave which he was granted) creates no 
additional burden, fhbc ia l  or otherwise, upon the district. In fact, the cdrnhation of Mr. 
Richards' Master's degree brings additional income to the district through the state 
reimbursement dotlocation table, It would seem unduly opportunistic of the district to take 
advantage of one of its stafimembers by refking to achow'edge his success and forcing 
him to take personal leave, yet reaping the benefits ofhis professiond development. As %s 
sitiration kth Mr. 5 5 c h d s  now rests, the district has an unfair advantage in. gaining 
professional development for the district while not making any contribution finanoiafly or 
olherwi+ to a person who has furthered his professional developme~t and hence the 
fort!.~coming improvement of the district. 
While leave approvals must oope &om the principal concerning teacher absences, nrt-where 
in the language of the Master Agreement oonoeming jprofessioid leave does it suggest that 
Ihe administxation (principal, superintendent or board) has the sole right to determine what 
professional &eyelopment is. The professional himself/herself clearly should be left to m&e 
that determination yJit$n reason of the teaching profession, and,& limitation oftwo days if 
they have not already been affoded professional development ,opportunities. Mr. Richards 
was not given that opportunity and, by Master Agxeement lainguage, he should be given tbe 
pmfessional courtesy of makinihis own decision. The intent of this language was to prevent 
exactly what h a ,  in fact, happened in this instance. Tho language was crafted and agreed 
upon in its cwent form to allow the individual empioyees 10 pursue their own professional 
development while fuly considering the desires of the adnliniskation for professional 
development of empfoyoes in regard.to partioular concerns of their buildiig or the district. 
Therefore we are asking you to ga i t  M. Richards professional leave in ofpersonal 
leave for his Nay 3 absence as he had odginally requested, Tbis res~1ution of a language 
disagreement would be in keeping v&h the spirit of the Naster.Agreernent lanpaga +s the 
PEA originally negotiated with the board. 
01/1,4/2008 11: 06 208875107P.> POTLATCH SCHOOL '"ST 
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Potlatch school District NO. 285 ~isb ; ic~ '~f f ice  (208)875-0327 
130 Sixth St. Eiemeentary School (208)875-1331 
Potlatch, ID 838554757 Jr.+Sr. High School (208)875-1231 
FAX (zoe)s7s-zozs 
June 27,2007 
Mr. Brian Potter 
Po$latch Education Asscoiation 
I3 0 6" Street 
Potlatch, ID 83855 
RE! P e%cnaVPrafessir~nE1 Leave Grievance - Schoal Board Response 
Dear Mr. Potter: 
Tfisnk you &I the o p p r i d t y  fa m t  on June 26,2007 to discuss tbe @wmm filed by the Potlatch 
Education Association. In the as so cia tic^^'^ grievance orighlly filed on June 7,2007, action 
requested or relief sought by the association was that Mr. Doug Richard's Ieave on May 3d be 
 ons side red profksswd leave instead of pmnal leave. Afcer cimfiil wnsidemtion by the four Potlatch 
School Board trustees present, the board voted to &urn the decision of the administration and deny the 
request of the Potlatch Education Association that Mr. Richard's leave on May 3'd ke coxxddered 
pro%sswd leave instead of persod leave. 
IQ making this dtcisioon, the boad of ttustees agreed that the presentation of a poafolio h a graduate 
class setting does pot constitute B pmfessional meeting, nor does it come under the clause of attending 
another school; the request did not meet the criteria fbr pro%ssional leave. In addition, the negotiated 
agreement requires that my leave be requested by the employee and subsequently approved by the 
principal. Approval wxs give& however that classification ox accounting o f  the time i s  left up to the 
discretion of the Administration. Nothkg in the contract grants to the employee the right to declare how 
rhe time is  accounted for by the district. The evidence presented Mjcated that a request was made by 
M?. Richards to zwunt fbr the t h e  as professional leave, it was deniod by tile principal and then the 
superintendent. 
That& you again Tor the opportunity to m e t  a .  work h u g h  this & r i e ~ ~ n c e  proczss. 
Chiyertwn of the Board 
Potlatch School District Ro. 285 District Ofiice (208)875-0327 
130 Sixth St. Elementary School (208)875-1331 
Potlatch, ID 83855-8757 h i - ~ r .  High school (208)875-1231 
FAX (208)875-1028 
Mr. Brim Potter 
President, Potlatch Education Association 
130 6" Street 
Pothtch, ID 83855 
Re: Binding Arbitrarion 
Mi-, Potter, 
on  October 11,2007, Superintendent Joseph A. ICren reported to the Potlatch School Board of 
Tmtees that a meeting took p h e  M e e n  you, Ms. Patty RobSfS and Mr. Kien. During that 
meeting, Ms. Roberts, spaking on your W s t a t e d  that in the matter of the grievauee 
reviewed by the Potlatch School District Baard of Trustees on June 26,2007 tZLe Potlatch 
Teacher Association, after d e w  by assoohtion counsel, feels they have a strong case to 
dispute the decision rendered by the Potlatch Board. Ms. Roberts went on to say that thn 
association would be agreeable to settling this disagreement &ugh binding a r b ~ o n .  
It is tl~e opinion of the bomd that the decision to deny the request of the Potlatch Education 
Association for a c e ~ s e d  employee's leave on May 3,2007 be considered pro&ssiomI leave 
instead ofwsonal leave is correct. We therefore decline your request for b i i  arbitration 
in this matter, 
- ~ & d i  L. Davis 
Chairperson of the Board 
2008 Contract hTegotiations 
* ... 
~. 
; 1/14/08 
Potlatch School Distict Board of Trustees Proposal #M 
The Potlatch School ~ i s 6 i c t  Board of Trustees proposes the following lanopage be added. 
to' Article X, paragraph 10.5 Professional Leave: Professional Development means 
activities which sustain a certifidated personnel's professional competence by keeping the 
cer'ci-ficated personnel infonned of, and able to comply with, developments of 
professional standards in all functions in which the certificated personnel practices or in 
which the certificated personnel is relied upon because of the certificated personnel's 
calling. 
In addition, as defined by Title IX, Part A, Section 910l'of the NO Child Lefi Behind Act, 
Professional Development Activities includes activities that: 
(i) improve and increase teachers' knowledge of the academic subjects the teachers 
teach, and enable teachers to become highly qualified; 
. . . . .  . . 
(ii) are an integral part of broad schoolwide and di.strictwide educational 
I improvement plans; 
(iii) give teachers, principals, and admi~listrators the knowledge and skills to provide 
students with the opportxnity to meet challenging State academic content 
standards and student academic achievement standards; 
(iv) improve classroom management skills; 
(v) (I) are high qualiiy, sustained, intensive, and classroom-focused in order to have 
a positive and lasting impact on classroom insbxction and the teacher's 
performance in the classroom; and 
(I0 are not 1-day or short-term workshops or conferences; 
(vi) support the recruiting, bving, aid &training of highly qualified teachers, including 
teachers who became highly qualified t!nro&~ State and local alternative routes to 
certification; 
(vii) advance teacher understanding of effective inslructional strategies that are - 
(I) based on scientifically based research; and 
(Q strategies for improving student academic achievement or 
substantially increasing the knowledge and teaching skills of 
teachers; and 
(viii) are aligned with and directly related to - 
(I) State academic content standards, student academic achievement 
standards, and assessments; and 
(ix) are developed with emensive paxticipation of teachers, principals, parents, and 
administrators of schools to be served under this Act; 
(xi) to the extent appropriate, provide training for teachers and ~"iacipals in the use of 
technology so that technology and technology applications are .effectivel~7 used in 
the classroom to improve teaching and learhing in the cunicula and core academic 
subjects in which the teachers teach; 
(xii) as a whole, are regularly evaluated for their impact on increaed teacher 
effectiveness and improved student academic achie~ement, witb the findings of 
the evaluations used to improve the quality of professional de~elopment; 
(xiii) provide insrruction in merhods of xeachg children with special needs; 
(xiv) include instruction in the use of data and assessments to infom and instruct 
classroom practice; and 
(m) include instruction in ways that teachers; principals, pupil services personnel, and 
school administrators nay  work more effectively with parents. 
John E. Rumel, Esq. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1 606 
James M. Piotrowski, Esq. 
Marty Durand, Esq. 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSKI, LLP 
713 West Franlclin Street 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2864 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-9200 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-9201 
CLERK OF DigTSICT i G g ~ j  
Attorneys for Plaintzffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 1 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
Case No. CV2007-1151 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING 
v. 
1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ) 
285, 
1 
Defendants. 
1 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 9" day of June, 2008, at 10.00 a.m, or as soon 
thereafter as counsel can be heard at the Latah County Courthouse, Moscow, Idaho, before the 
Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge, Plaintiffs Potlatch Education Association and Doug 
NOTICE OF HEARWG - I 
Richards will call up for hearing their Motion to Strike Defendants' Jury Demand and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
U" 
DATl Y ' W U \ ,  3D this day of May, 2008. 
DAHO EDU TXON 
1 
By: ' J Fohn E. Rumel 
Attorney for Plaintiff Potlatch Educatio~i 
Associatio~l and Doug Richards 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the q % a y  of May, 2008, I caused a true and con-ect 
copy of the foregoing to be served via: 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Trans 
Band Delivered 
to: 
Brian K. Julian, Esq. 
Davis VanderVelde, Esq. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Facsimile: 344-55 10 
/lg2&LLd- Qy/ 
John E. Rumel 
NOTICE OF B E M G  - 3 
IEA LEGAL SER!. . .  . PaGE 02/04 
i , 
Brian K. Julian - ISB No. 2360 23flfj Hb,y 21 ti9 10: 56 
Amy G.White - IS6 No. 501 9 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP CLERK OF @$fiiCT COURT L&TiiH CoUli'?i C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, ,Suite 700 . . 
Post Office Box 7428 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-55 I0 
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw,com 
awhite_@ajhlaw.co~ 
P.ttorney~."- for DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAW 
POTLATCH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION and DOUG RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff(s), 
VS. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
285, 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
STIPULATION TQ CONTINUE 
ffEARiMG DATE 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and Defendants, by and through their 
coclnsel of record, and based upon the following information, hereby 
stipulate and agree that after the scheduling conference of Monday, March 
3, 2008, counsel for the parties have Further discussed this case and have 
determined that additional time for discovery is needed in order to insure 
STIfPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -1 
TEA LEGAL SERU .S PAGE 03/84 
i -
that all relevant evidence is discovered and produced. The parties are 
therefore requesting that the current, hearing date in this matter of June 9, 
y this Honorable Court To June 30, 2008, with the relevant 
to correlate the new hearing date and time. 
DATED this of May, 2008. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LtP 
Idaho Education Association 
A 
STIIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -2 
05/21/2008 21: 29 20834411 , IEA LEGAL SERV. 3 
-- . . .. . , . . . , . . . . _ . . . . . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAiLLNG 
i HEREBY CERTIFY that  on f h i s ~ d y  of, May 2008, 1 sewad a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
NEARIAIG DATE by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, ad follows: 
John E. Rurnel I I U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 1 Hand-~elivered 
620 North 2@38 [ I overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701 
[ d ~ a c s i r n i l e  
.Te!ephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1 606 
James M. Pioxrowski [ I U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Marty Durand [ I Hand-Deiivered 
HERZFELD & PIOTROWSI<I, LLP [ 1 Overnight Mail 
71 3 West Franklin Street 1. / Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2864 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2864 
Telephone: (208) 331 -9200 
Facsimile: (208) 331 -9201 
STllPULATlON TO CONTINUE HEARING DATE -3 0 0 0 4 2 1  
i i ~ ;  
(j gD7'-li q CASE Nc; . 
- . , . . . 
Brian K. Julian - ISB NO. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019 2QOB M y  28 ~ 8 . f  2: 45 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza " CLEM OF D~STR~CJT GOUST 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite LATP,H CO!J~;Y 
Post Office Box 7426 . ,.. By :-..&~p{jp 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-580 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: biulian@.aihlaw.com 
awhite@aihlaw.com 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
and DOUG RICHARDS, 
Pla in t i f f ( s ) ,  
V S ,  
Upon Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefor, 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
ORDER VACATING AND 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 285, 
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, adjudge 
RESETTING HEARING DATE 
and decree that the hearing currently set for June 9, 2008 be vacated and reset to 
.
d "fh June 30, 2008 a t  10:OO a.m.(p$t) 
I#- DATED this & day of May, 2008. 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE - 1 QOUl22 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s a d a y  of May, 2008, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Vacating and Resetfing Hearing by delivering 
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
John E. ~ u r n e l  [i] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Idaho Education Association [ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail P.0, Box 2638 [ 1 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Brian I<. Julian 
Anderson Julian & Hull 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
~ lerk 'o f  the Court 
ORDER VACATING AND RESETTING HEARING DATE - 2 
I\. (. ...; 
A -  
. , & O E ~ G ~ B A ~  NG !-\-..J@? 1 1  - ,--. j&-, 
Brian K. Julian - ISB NO. 2360 
Amy G. White - ISB No. 5019 ?!?OR JUW 18 dlf g: i 8 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
CLERK OF f i~~fi?!: ;~ c0uRT 'C. W. Moore Plaza 
LI,%AH C s u ~ ~ y  250  south Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post  0 , f f i c  Box 7426 -..-- &PIJTY 
Boise, Idaho 8370717426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
.. . Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: biulian@aihlaw.com 
awhite@aihlaw.com 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
POTLATCH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
and DOUG RICHARDS, 
VS. 
POTLATCH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285, 
and BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POTLATCH 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 285, 
Case No. CV 2007-1 151 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND NON- 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above entitled Defendants, by and through their attorneys 
of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and submits this Response t o  Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion t o  Strike Demand 
for Jury Trial. Submitted contemporaneously is the Affidavit of Joseph Kren, 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NON- 
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Superintendent of Potlatch School District, in Support of Defendants' Response to  
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The essence of this case is the interpretation of the professional leave clause 
o f  the Master Agreement between the Potlatch Education Association and 
Defendants. However, Plaintiffs interpretation of the professional leave clause 
would turn the professional leave granted by  Defendants t o  its certificated 
employees into a form of personal leave, available not at the discretion of the 
principal or site administrator, but  at the discretion of the employee. 
The professional leave clause is not ambiguous, and i ts plain language makes 
i t  clear that it is the prerogative of the principal t o  decide whether professional 
leave wil l  be allowed. In this case, Defendants decided that professional leave 
would not  be granted because the reason for which the professional leave was 
requested did not meet the guidelines of what professional leave was designed for. 
In addition, Mr. Richards had taken multiple professional leave days prior t o  the 
May 3 date, and had exceeded the maximum of t w o  allotted days. Thus, regardless 
of what reason was given for requesting time off, Mr.  Richards should have 
requested that a personal day be used, as he was over the limit o f  allowable 
~rofess ional  leave. 
Ultimately, a majority of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
irrelevant, as the only issue is the interpretation o f  the professional leave clause. 
Because Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that i t  is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
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is not allowed and is unnecessary. This brief will present those issues discussed 
above. 
In addition, Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs' Motion t o  Strike 
Defendants' Demand for Jury Trial, and will file no briefing in response. 
11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS t 
Plaintiff Doug Richards is an employee of Defendant Potlatch School District, 
No. 285. Affidavit of Doug Richards in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 7 1 (hereinafter cited as "Richards Affidavit"). Defendant Potlatch 
School District has a master agreement w i th  the Potlatch Education Associat~on. 
See Affidavit of Joseph Kren, Ex. A (hereinafter cited as "Kren Affidavit"). This 
Master Agreement contains a professional leave clause, which states: 
10.5 Professional Leave 
Attendance at  educational meetings or visiting other schools is 
permitted at  full pay if such absence is approved by the Principal. If 
any certificated personnel wishes t o  be absent from duty for a brief 
period t o  attend a professional meeting, to  visit schools, or otherwise 
pursue professional development, a writ ten request for approval of 
such absence should be signed by the Principal and filed in the 
Superintendent's office at least t w o  (2) days prior t o  the first day of 
anticipated absence. Professional leave is not  to  exceed t w o  (2) days 
per year and is non-cumulative. The Principal may make exceptions on 
the number of days allowed when necessary. 
Kren Affidavit, Ex. A. The Master Agreement, including the professional leave 
clause, was  negotiated by t w o  sophisticated parties in an arm's length transaction. 
Kren Affidavit, ( 4. Both the Potlatch Education Association and Defendant 
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Potlatch School District provided language used in the professional leave clause. 
See Potter Affidavit, Ex. A 
On October 6, 2006, Mr. ~ i c h a r d s  was  granted one day o f  professional 
leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B .  On December 8, 2006, Mr. Richards was granted 
'/2 day of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. On December 15, 2008, 
Mr.  Richards was granted three hours of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. 
B. On either February 15  or 16, 2007, Mr. Richards was granted one day of 
professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. 5. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Richards was 
absent from his assigned duties, and the absence was assigned t o  Mr. Richards' 
personal leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. On or about May 18, 2007, Mr. Richards 
was granted one half day of professional leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. B.  
111. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. LEGAL STANDARD 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the proper inquiry is 
whether "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together wi th the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as t o  any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter o f  law." lRCP 56ic). 
"The record is construed in the light most favorable t o  the non-moving party, and 
all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor o f  that party." Carl H. Christensen 
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133  ldaho 866, 870  (ldaho 1999) .  This includes 
factual inferences. Herrera v. Conner, 11 1 ldaho 1012, 1021 (Idaho Ct. App. 
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In determining whether an issue of material fact is in dispute, facts 
should be liberally construed in favor of the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought and all doubts are to  be resolved against 
the moving party. . . . [A] motion for s'ummary judgment must be 
denied i f  the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be draw 
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. 
Ashby v. Hubbard,'100 ldaho 67, 69 (Idaho 1979). "No dispute o f  fact is deemed 
"material" within Rule 56(c )  unless i t  relates t o  an issue disclosed by the 
pleadings." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 ldaho 668, 669-670 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). 
If the contract at  issue in this case is determined to  be ambiguous, the 
interpretation of the contract is a question of fact, which cannot be resolved on 
summary judgment. Carl H. Chrisfensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 
866, 873 - 74 (ldaho 1999). 
B. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE CLAUSE, 
THE PRINCIPAL HAS DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
PROFESSIONAL LEAVE WILL BE GRANTED, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS 
CANNOT FORCE DEFENDANTS TO GRANT PROFESSIONAL LEAVE. 
The professional leave clause in the Master Agreement does t w o  things: it 
gives examples of the types of reasons for which professional leave might be 
granted, and it gives school district administrators discretion t o  determine whether 
t o  grant professional leave time. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seem to be taking the 
stand that professional leave must be granted i f  a qualified employee requests it. 
This interpretation, however, is not  only directly opposite the spirit of the 
professional leave clause, but is directly contradictory t o  i ts  plain language. ldaho 
contract law prevents such a result. This section will discuss the  language of the 
professional leave clause which gives the principal authority to  grant professional 
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leave. Whether an activity qualifies for professional leave will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
1 .  Where the Plain Languaqe of the Professional Leave Clause qives 
There 
is No Breach of Contract When Discretion is Exercised. 
Plaintiffs have correctly pointed out "the primary responsibility of a court in 
determining the requirements of contracts is to  ascertain the contracting parties' 
intent." Plainfiffs'Mernorandum (citing Straub v. Smith, 145 ldaho 65, 69 (2007)) .  
Contrary t o  Plaintiffs' contentions, though, the parties' intent for an unambiguous 
contract is no t  determined by looking at extrinsic evidence such as drafts or 
previous used clauses, or negotiation history. Intent is determined using i h e  plain 
language of the contract. "As an initial matter, this Court must determine the legal 
effect of the parties' writ ten contract. The interpretation of a contract begins wi th 
the language o f  the contract itself. I f  the language o f  the contract is unambiguous, 
then i ts meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words." Cristo Viene 
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 1 6 0  P.3d 743, 747  (Idaho 2007)  (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). See also independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining 
Co., 143  ldaho 22 ,  2 6  (Idaho 2006) ("The interpretation of a contract begins with 
the language o f  the contract itself. If the terms of the contract are clear and 
unambiguous, the meaning and legal effect of the  contract are questions o f  law 
which must be determined f rom the plain meaning o f  the words used."). 
If the language used by the parties is plain, complete, and 
unambiguous, the intention of the pariies must be gathered f rom that 
language, and from that  language alone, no matter what  the actual or 
secret intentions o f  the  parties may have been. Presumptively, the 
intent of the parties t o  a contract is expressed by the natural and 
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ordinary meaning o f  their language referable to  it, and such meaning 
cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts through construction, 
for the parties are presumed t o  have intended what the  terms clearly 
state. 
17A Am. Jur. 2d CONTRACTS 5 348. The ldaho Supreme Court has clarified this 
principal, stating 
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial t o  the 
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective law of contract 
interpretation, the court wil l give force and effect t o  the  words o f  the 
contract without regard t o  what  the parties t o  the contract thought it 
meant or what they actually intended for it to  mean. The court will not 
attempt t o  ascertain the actual mental processes o f  the parties in 
entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the 
parties understood the import of their contract and tha t  they had the 
intention which its terms manifest. 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (ldaho 2006) (quoting 17A Am. Jur 
2d CONTRACTS § 347) .  
The language of the professional leave clause is straightforward. I t  states 
that "Attendance at  educational meetings or visiting other schools is permi t ted at 
full pay if such absence is approved b v  the Principal." See Kren Affidavit, Ex. A. 
This language clearly gives the principal discretion t o  determine whether or not  
professional leave will be granted. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, make several 
interesting statements regarding Mr. Richards' right t o  professional leave. For 
example, "Richards was entif led t o  use a Professional Leave day t o  travel to  and 
defend his final project for his Master's Degree." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 1.2 
(emphasis added). Similarly, "the Professional Leave provisions of the Master 
Agreement unambiguously required the School District t o  approve Richards' request 
t o  use a professional leave day." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 11.  These assertions 
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indicate that it is Plaintiffs' belief that professional leave must be given when it is 
requested. The plain language of the professional leave clause surely does not 
require such a result, particularly where discretion is vested in the principal, not the 
ployee. 
2. I n r e e m e n t  as a Whole, of Al l  the types of 
Leave, Only the Professional Leave Clause does not  Require 
Mandatorv Granting of Leave. 
In malting their assertion that Mr.  Richards was entitled t o  personal leave, 
Plaintiffs cite various canons of contract construction. See Plaintiffs'Memorandum, 
p. 9. Another canon which is relevant to  this case is that "A contract must be 
construed as a whole, and the intention of the parties is t o  be ascertained from the 
entire instrument." 17A Am. Jur. 2d CONTRACTS § 375. See also Shawver v. 
Huck/eberry Estates, L.L.C., 1 4 0  Idaho 354, 3 6 1  (Idaho 2004)  ("In determining the 
intent of the parties, this Court must v iew the contract as a whole."). A review of 
the entire contract shows that the intention of the parties was t o  give discretion to  
grant professional leave t o  the principal. There are several types of leave mentioned 
in the Master Agreement. Regarding sick leave, the master agreement states 
"Certificated personnel shaN be granted leave of absence for personal illness or 
injury wi th  full pay ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 27 (emphasis added). Regarding 
family illness leave, the Master Agreement states "Upon proper notification to the 
building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted leave of absence at 
full pay for serious illness in their immediate family ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29 
(emphasis added). For funeral leave, the Master Agreement states "Upon proper 
notification t o  the building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted 
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leave of absence at full pay t o  attend funerals ..." Kren ~ f f i dav i f ,  Ex. A, p. 2 9  
(emphasis added). The Master Agreement similarly addresses leave for jury duty, 
military service, and Association leave, in each case affirmatively s 
ypes of leave "shall" be given. Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 31. 
The Master Agreement also addresses personal leave, stating "Upon 
approval o f  the building administrator, certificated personnel shall be granted leave 
of absence at full pay ..." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29 (emphasis added). Unlike the 
previously discussed types of leave, the building administrator must give approval 
before personal leave is granted. However, once the approval is given, granting 
personal leave is mandatory, as indicated by the "shall" language 
Professional leave is different from every other type of leave mentioned in 
the Master Agreement. There is no "shall" language in the professional leave clause 
which requires that professional leave be granted; in fact, the language is quite 
permissive, stating that professional leave "is permitted ... if such absence is 
approved b y  the Principal." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29 (emphasis added). This 
language does not equate t o  Plaintiffs' interpretation o f  the professional leave 
clause, which apparently would read "when a certificated employee identifies an 
activity that  the employee has determined qualifies for professional leave, 
professional leave shall be granted." Plaintiffs' interpretation of the professional 
leave clause would nullify any discretion given t o  the principal in the clause, and 
would effectively turn The professional leave allowance into a mandatory personal 
leave requirement. 
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Without professional leave, a certificated employee has 24 days of paid leave 
that must be given (not including unlimited leave for jury duty) and which 
Defendants are obligated to  provide.' Plaintiffs are attemptin 
discretionary nature of the professional leave clause, and cr 
mandatory leave days simply based on an employee's determination that the leave 
would be for a professional purpose. 
In construing the Master Agreement as a whole, it is clear that  the intent of 
the professional leave clause is different from the other types of leave. The plain 
language for sick leave, personal leave, and the other various types of leave 
indicates that these leaves are mandatory, and Defendant School District has no 
discretion in whether they should be granted. In contrast, the professional leave 
language is very permissive, in that there is no requirement that  professional leave 
be given. The plain, unambiguous language, states that professional leave may be 
granted by the administration. The facts of this case show that  Mr.  Richards had 
been granted professional leave on multiple occasions prior t o  the request for May 
3, but  for that particular date professional leave was not granted. This was within 
the discretion of Defendant School Dislrict, and therefore Plaintiffs have no right 10 
demand that the decision t o  classify Mr.  Richards: leave on May  3, 2007 be 
nullified and that the leave be reclassified as professional leave. Where discretion 
was exercised when discretion is contractually given, there is no breach of 
7 The Master Agreement requires that Defendants provide 11 days of paid sick leave, 3 days 
of paid famiiy sick leave, 3 days of funeral leave, 4 days of personal leave, and 3 days of 
association leave. See Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, pp. 27' - 31. This calculation does not include 
accumulated sick leave, on which there is no limit, accumulated personal leave, which may 
accumulate t o  5 days per year, and accumulated association leave, which may accumulate up to 76 
days per year. 
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contract. Therefore Defendants respectfully request that  Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment be denied. 
C. THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE REQUIREMENT DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THAT PROFESSIONAL LEAVE BE GIVEN FOR A CERTIFICATED 
EMPLOYEE TO PURSUE EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT. 
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Richards was "entitled" t o  professional leave 
because the "defense of his final project for his Master's Degree in Education from 
the University of ldaho clearly constituted pursuit o f  professional development." 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 9. This argument ignores the discretionary aspect of 
the professional leave clause, and focus solely on whether Mr. Richards' reason for 
requesting professional leave qualifies for professional leave. While this argument is 
almost completely irrelevant t o  a determination of whether there has been a breach 
of contract, Defendants are compelled to  address the issue as it is the focus of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Both the first and second sentence in the professional leave clause address 
reasons w h y  professional leave may be granted: "Attendance a t  educational 
meetings o r  visiting other schools is permitted . . . . If any certificated personnel 
wishes to  be absent from duty  for a brief period to a t lend  a professional meeting, 
to visit schools, o r  otherwise pursue professional development, a writ ten request 
for approval [is required]." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A (emphasis added). The other t w o  
sentences do not address what  qualifies for professional leave. Thus, professional 
leave may be granted for attendance at  educational or professional meetings, t o  
visit schools, or to pursue professional development. 
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The simple fact  is that  there is nothing in the professional leave clause that 
indicates that it applies t o  Mr. Richards' master's degree. Plaintiffs argue that the 
phrase "professional development" includes educational advancement, and is 
identical to  the term "professional growth" used in a different clause in the Master 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 10. In malting this connection, Plaintiffs 
rely on the maxim "where nothing in the context indicates otherwise, words used 
in one sense in one Dart of the contract are deemed t o  have been used in the same 
sense in another, part of the same instrument." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 9 
(quoting Bair v. Barron, 9 7  Idaho 26,  30 (1975)) .  
In making this argument, Plaintiffs seek t o  compare the professional leave 
clause, which gives specific examples o f  reasons to grant professional leave, wi th  
an article of Master Agreement dealing w i th  salaries, which are based on 
experience and education. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 10.   ow ever, there are 
distinguishing features which prevent the terms "professional development" and 
"professional growth" from being interpreted identically. Primarily, the context is so 
dissimilar that  they can't mean the same thing. "Professional growth" is used in the 
context of salaries. Article XV (Salary) of the Master Agreement specifically states 
that the purpose of the salary schedule is to  "stimulate professional growth while in 
service." Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 45. To match this purpose, 'pay is based on 
experience and on educational attainments. In this context, the term "professional 
growth" is connected wi th  an intention t o  promote education. 
To contrast, the term "professional development" is not  connected with 
educational advancement, but is connected with "professional meetings" and 
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"visit[ing] schools". Kren Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 30. As  can be seen from Mr.  Richards' 
reasons for professional leave throughout the 2006-2007 school year, he 
understood this. In October, 2006, ards toolc professional leave for 
inservice regarding music at  the Un Idaho. Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. In 
December, Mr. Richards' requests for personal leave involved a concert rehearsal 
and a Christmas program. Kren Affidavit, Ex. B. The professional leave granted in 
February, 2007 involved a music event in Portland, Oregon. Kren Affi'davif, Ex. 8. 
These events are professional meetings or visiting schools. The point of the 
professional leave clause is not  t o  allow Mr. Richards t o  finish school; finishing his 
education was Mr. Richards' responsibility, not Defendants', and should be done on 
Mr. Richards' personal time, as it is not  directly related t o  his employment wi th 
Defendant School District. Defendant School District has provided i ts certificated 
employees wi th  ~nul t ip le "personal" days which are designed to  address exactly 
such situations, namely "business that cannot be conducted when school is not in 
session." Kren Affidavf't, Ex. A, p. 29. Thus, Mr. Richards was required t o  use 
personal leave, and not  professional leave. In making the comparison between 
"professional growth" and "professional purpose", Plaintiffs are trying to  equate 
t w o  situations altin t o  comparing apples w i th  Chihuahuas; while various 
connections can be drawn, such a comparison isn't helpful. 
This analysis of the context shows that the language of the professional 
leave clause and the Master Agreement as a whole does not tend toward an 
interpretation which would allow time needed for personal educational 
advancement t o  be taken of f  in the form of professional leave. As stated above, 
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personal educational advancement is provided for through personal leave time. 
Professional leave is  specifically designed to  provide paid leave for events that 
employees would not be obligated t o  attend bu t  for their professional 
responsibilities, including "educational ~neetings or visiting other schools." Kren 
Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 29. Though Mr. Richards' decision t o  obtain a master's degree 
will ultimately affect his employment w i th  Defendant School District (in that i t  will 
cause an increase in his pay), there is no evidence showing that Mr. Richards 
decision t o  get his master's degree is related t o  his professional responsibilities. 
Defendant School District recognized this when they informed Mr.  Richards that the 
presentation o f  his master's degree project did not  "fall under the spirit of the 
professional development clause." Poffer Affidavit, Ex. E.  There is a difference 
between continuing education for professionals and primary education to  complete 
a degree. Professional leave is designed for the former, and personal leave is 
available for the latter. Therefore there is no breach o f  contract by denying Mr. 
Richards the use o f  professional leave, particularly when he had exhausted his 
professional leave, for personal educational advancement. As  such, Plaintiffs are 
entitled t o  no equitable relief, and summary judgment should be denied 
D. THERE ARE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING HOW MUCH 
PROFESSIONAL LEAVE MR. RICHARDS HAD TAKEN PRIOR TO M A Y  3, 
2007, AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE. 
Plaintiffs have indicated that Mr. Richards requested only t w o  professional 
leave days during the 2006-2007 school year. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 4; 
Richards Affidavit, 1 4. There appears t o  be a factual dispute as to  whether this 
allegation is accurate. Defendants' records show that  Mr.  Richards took 
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professional leave on October 6, 2006 (1 day), December 8, 2006  ( %  day), 
December 15, 2006 (3  hours, or 318 day), and February 15  or 16  (1  day). Kren 
Ex. B. Thus before Mr. Richards requested professional leave for May 3, 
had taken 2.875 professional leave days. 
This is significant because the professional leave clause clearly states that 
"Professional leave is not t o  exceed t w o  (2) days per year and is non-cumulative. 
The Principal may make exceptions on the number of days allowed when 
necessary.'" Kren Affidavit, Ex. A. As it is clear that it is discretionary whether 
professional leave is granted, it is possible that  part of the consideration in 
determining that Mr. Richards would not  be granted professional leave for May 3, 
2007  was that he had already been granted more than the amount o f  professional 
leave that was allowed. While no t  stated as such a reason in the communications 
between Mr. Richards and Defendants, sucha  consideration is a factor, and cannot 
be discounted. Therefore, since Mr. Richards was already over the amount of 
allowable days, and even assuming Plaintiffs' contention that De.fendants were 
obligated l o  grant professional leave days should the employee claim the  leave was 
for a professional purpose, leave could not have been granted because there was 
no available leave. Defendants did not violate the terms of the Master Agreement, 
while in  contrast Mr. Richards attempted to  do so by  requesting more professional 
2 Once again; this language shows the discretionary nature of this clause. The Principal is 
allowed to decide whether and when more professional leave should be granted. This clearly shows 
that professional leave is not mandatory, and therefore there can be no breach when professional 
leave is denied. 
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leave than was allowed. The result is that Superintendent Kren properly enforced 
the contract by requiring tha t  personal leave be taken. 
The determination o f  whether Mr. Richards had taken more than t w o  days of 
fessional leave prior t o  May 3, 2007 is a dispute of material fact, as it is 
relevant t o  a determination of whether Mr. Richards was even entitled t o  take 
professional leave. Because there is an issue of material fact, summary judgment 
should not be granted. Palmer v, ldaho Bank & Trust, 1 0 0  ldaho 642, 644 (Idaho 
1979).  
E. THE MASTER AGREEMENT M A Y  NOT BE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY 
AGAINST DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT AS THE PARTIES WERE 
SOPHISTICATED PARTIES WHO NEGOTIATED A T  ARM'S LENGTH, AND 
BOTH PARTIES CONTRIBUTED LANGUAGE TO THE CONTRACT. 
Plaintiffs contend that  the Master Agreement, including the professional 
leave clause, must be construed most strongly against Defendant School District, 
based on the  axiom that where there is "doubtful language in the contract, ir will 
be interpreted most  strongly against the party who provided that language." 
Plainfiffs' Memorandum, p. 9.  In support of this argument, Plaintiffs contend that 
"the PEA and School Board's bargaining history reveals that the School Board 
proposed the  language of the version of the Professional Leave provisions that 
ultimately ended up in the Master Agreement." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 11. 
However, the  side-by-side comparison of the proposed professional leave clauses 
by both the School Board and the PEA shows that neither proposed clause was 
ultimately used. Poffer Affidavif, Ex. A. The professional leave clause, as wi th the 
rest o f  the Master Agreement, was not  the result of unequal bargaining power or 
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an adhesion contract by Defendants, but was a negotiated agreement by 
sophisticated parties w i t h  language being provided by both sides. Kren Affidavit, q/ 
4. Therefore the maxim on which Plaintiffs rely does not  apply. 
In any case, the language ultimately used in the professional leave clause 
does not match the proposed language by  either party. There is no evidence as to  
who actually provided such language. Since it cannot be determined from the facts 
before this court which party provided the language in the current professional 
leave clause, there is a material issue of fact  regarding this issue. As such, 
summary judgment would be inappropriate. 
F. IF THE PROFESSIONAL LEAVE CLAUSE IS AMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GRANTED AS THE DETERMINTION OF INTENT IS 
A QUESTION OF FACT. 
Plaintiffs and Defendants fundamentally disagree regarding the application of 
the professional leave clause. As  discussed above, Plaintiffs' arguments indicate 
that  they believe that professional leave must be granted i f  the certificated 
employee identifies a reason which the employee believes qualifies for professional 
leave. Defendants' interpretation follows the language of the professional leave 
clause, which gives Defendant School District the discretion t o  determine whether 
leave is appropriately classified as professional leave, and discretion to  grant 
professional leave. A fundamental disagreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of a contract need not result in a conclusion that the clause over 
which the disagreement arose is ambiguous. Rather, for a contract term t o  be 
ambiguous, "there must  be at least t w o  different reasonable interpretations of the 
term, or i t  must be nonsensical." Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 175 P.3d 748, 
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751 (Idaho 2007)  (internal citations omitted). The question o f  whether there is an 
ambiguity in a contract is a question of law, and is therefore appropriately 
determined on summary judgment. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 1 4 0  
Idaho 354, 362 (2004).  However, if an ambiguity does exist, the  resolution of the 
ambiguity is a question of fact  which may not be resolved on summary judgment. 
ld. 
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' interpretations of the  professional leave clause 
surely conflict. Plaintiffs' interpretation relnoves discretion t o  grant professional 
leave, and Defendants' interpretation allows fo'r discretion t o  grant professional 
leave. Despite this conflict, Plaintiffs contend that there is no ambiguity in the 
professional leave clause. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 11.  Defendants agree, 
however this because Defendants believe that Plaintiffs' interpretation of the 
professional leave clause is unreasonable, in that it completely strips Defendant 
School District o f  any discretion to  grant or deny professional leave as provided for 
in the clause. 
It is the Court's prerogative t o  determine whether there is an ambiguity in 
the contract. If the Court should determine that the t w o  interpretations put forth by 
Defendants and Plaintiffs are both reasonable, then there is an ambiguity in the 
contract, and Defendants would respectfully request that  summary judgment be 
denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
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Plaintiffs contend that there are three breaches of contract: t w o  breaches of 
the Master Agreement (w i th  both Mr.  Richards and the PEA, respectively), and one 
breach o f  the employment agreement between Defendants and Mr. Richards. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum, pp. 12 - 13. All  three of these alleged breaches will be 
resolved based on the interpretation of the professional leave clause. Defendants 
contend that the clause gives Defendants the discretion t o  determine what 
constitutes professional leave and whether it should be granted. The plain language 
of the clause supports this, allowing the Principal t o  approve of granling such 
leave. Further, the language in the Master Agreement regarding other types of 
leave shows that they are mandatory, whereas the language for professional leave 
is permissive. Therefore Plaintiffs have no right t o  argue that there has been a 
breach of contract when Defendants acted upon the discretion that they are given 
under the clause, and as a result, have no right t o  equitable relief. Defendants 
respectfully request that  Summary Judgment be denied. 
DATED this /6 ?y of June, 2008. 
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